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31 Introduction
The empirical analysis of monetary policy is an active field with a great number 
of studies that attempt to characterize and analyze monetary policy. There are 
also new methods and developments that try to better capture the practice of 
monetary policy and the changes in policy over time. Now that more than ten 
years have passed since the beginning of the common monetary union, it is a 
relatively opportune time to evaluate the behavior of the European Central Bank 
by estimating linear and nonlinear models to examine the interest rate policy of 
the ECB. This thesis should also give some idea of how different models 
perform at this task. The empirical estimation of monetary policy rules is a very 
commonly applied method for the evaluation of monetary policy. Monetary 
theory has increasingly endeavored to apply a systematic approach to policy 
behavior in a modern theoretical context. This has resulted in an ever growing 
literature on rules-based monetary policy of which Woodford (2003) has been 
the most dominant account. One strand of research in this vein has been an 
analysis of monetary policy reaction functions with different specifications of 
policy rules, most commonly with Taylor rules functioning as relatively simple 
approximations of optimal monetary policy. There is no shortage of such studies 
for the ECB either, but this thesis should offer at least a few new potentially 
significant contributions. The results in this thesis also suggest that rational 
expectations modeling may well be less reliable for the ECB than the alternative 
of employing explicit forecasts. The empirical contributions of this thesis include 
the estimated reaction functions based on real-time data for a time period 
spanning from January 1999 to June 2009, and the estimated reaction functions 
that are based on biannual and quarterly forecasts published in the ECB 
Monthly Bulletins from December 2000 to June 2010. The estimated models 
include standard Taylor rules and less common nonlinear models. 
Monetary policy issues are often analyzed with both simple and optimal rules in 
different contexts. Such rules can be used as rough guidelines for monetary 
policy, in theoretical models, and in econometric research. The rules can be 
useful for both external and internal analysis (Berg et al. 2004). Externally, it is 
4possible to study past policy and to forecast future policy. Internally, central 
banks can evaluate policy alternatives and use them for communication 
purposes. The theoretical and general section of this thesis covers a discussion 
of some of  the main ideas of this literature. A policy rule is understood in this 
thesis in the flexible manner that it is often treated in modern analysis. This 
means that a policy rule is loosely considered  to be a “prescribed guide to 
monetary policy”, as defined by Svensson (1999). The main virtue of this 
definition is to allow for optimal rules, targeting rules, instrument rules and 
simple feedback rules. These concepts will be covered in the thesis as part of 
an overview on monetary policy rules. The treatment will be fairly broad since 
the overview attempts to reflect at least some of the main ideas of the literature 
on this matter. This exposition therefore mostly concentrates on some of the 
core concepts.       
Since a large number of similar empirical studies do exist, it is worth underlining 
some of the potentially noteworthy aspects of this thesis. The ECB has had the 
task of conducting monetary policy for more than ten years, which should make 
the estimation of reaction functions an increasingly palatable approach due to 
an increasingly lengthy sample period. This should make estimation results 
more reliable and potentially more accurate than they have been in the past. 
This thesis is also entirely focused on using real-time data in all circumstances, 
which is often seen as preferable to revised data. The difference between real-
time data and revised data can have an important effect on results, as argued 
by Orphanides (2001) in particular. The real-time database that facilitates the 
use of real-time data has only recently become easily available, which is 
probably why it has been previously used very rarely. This study also employs 
Eurosystem and ECB staff forecasts, another potentially extremely useful 
source of data that probably has not been made use of up to this point. This is 
likely because of the sporadic nature of these forecasts, which is admittedly still 
a practical difficulty. In spite of that, this thesis will show that actual forecasts 
paint a significantly different picture of monetary policy, while also avoiding 
some of the issues with forward-looking models that rely on instrumented 
variables. This thesis also contains several nonlinear estimations, which are 
uncommon in comparison to linear counterparts. The nonlinear model used for 
5this purpose is a recent proposal of Boinet and Martin (2008), which provides a 
fairly flexible monetary policy model, and which allows the analysis of some 
non-standard aspects of monetary policy.
  
The structure of this thesis is as follows. The first few chapters discuss 
monetary policy modeling in a general way and introduce a number of issues 
relevant to the empirical section and also cover empirical studies similar to this 
one. Chapter two begins with a general discussion of monetary policy rules and 
includes a short history of such rules, while the main modern alternatives are 
considered more extensively. The distinction between optimal and simple rules 
is discussed, as well as concepts such as discretion and commitment. The New 
Keynesian model is also introduced since it is used on several occasions in this 
thesis. Chapter three covers Taylor rules, which in their various forms are the 
most popular empirical formulas. Chapter four is quite broad in scope and 
covers certain important extensions such as the empirically significant 
phenomenon of interest rate smoothing. Chapter five is an overview of some 
related studies, with examples particularly for the US Fed and the ECB. Chapter 
six is a short chapter on ECB policy. This chapter covers some of the general 
principles of ECB policy and includes a short look at how policy is conducted 
and some of the recent changes in the operative framework brought on by the 
financial crisis.  
The empirical section of this thesis begins in chapter seven, which gives details 
about the data that is used in this thesis. This section explains the data sources, 
the variables that are used and how the variables have been transformed 
before estimation. Chapter eight details the estimation method and the 
estimations. First, there is a section that deals with the choice of estimation 
method. Since this thesis makes extensive use of the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimation, it is covered in some detail. The reason for using 
GMM for forward-looking rules is explained, as well as other issues relevant to 
carrying out the estimations. Chapter eight also contains the results for all the 
estimations. These include estimates for contemporary Taylor rules, forward-
looking rules with the rational expectations method, the nonlinear rules and the 
forecast-based estimations. Chapter nine offers some final conclusions.  
62 Monetary policy rules
2.1 Background on policy rules
Policy rules have been commonly advocated to stabilize the economy, to make 
monetary policy more consistent and transparent, or even to make it more 
accountable. Prescriptively these rules have attempted to define what would be 
good monetary policy. For instance, discretionary policy can lead to a 
suboptimal outcome, as shown by Barro and Gordon (1983). Discretionary 
policy refers to policy that is chosen freely in any time period. A discretionary 
central bank with an overly ambitious output goal will result in an incentive to 
inflate. The implication is that optimal policy is not time-consistent. By 
committing to not exploit this incentive the bias could be eliminated. In the New 
Keynesian models that do not have the problem of an overambitious output goal 
there can still be a stabilization bias caused by discretionary policy. 
In general systematic policy is widely perceived as valuable. This is something 
that Woodford (2003) has also emphasized in his comprehensive work on policy 
rules. Systematic policy can be important when expectations about policy are 
important, as they very commonly are in modern analysis, like in the dichotomy 
between discretion and commitment. Systematic policy will also be more 
transparent, and the need for transparency has become increasingly 
underscored in modern monetary policy. At the same time policy also needs to 
be comprehensible. It is possible to state goals for monetary policy, such as the 
now typical announcement of an explicit inflation target. These goals are not 
directly controlled by policymakers, however, so more specificity is necessary. 
In addition to different normative considerations about good monetary policy, 
policy rules are commonly used for descriptive purposes. Simple rules are often 
quite useful for this purpose. Monetary policy is most often modeled in the 
literature as something akin to a Taylor rule or more rigorously as optimal policy 
under either discretion or commitment. These main scenarios are eventually 
covered in this text. 
7Proposals for the conduct of monetary policy have a very long history. To give 
some context and background on monetary policy rules, a short summary of the 
history of monetary rules is provided that draws mainly from the account of Asso 
et al. (2007). The idea of monetary rules, like various other concepts in 
economics, can be traced at least back to Adam Smith, who wrote about how a 
well-regulated paper money would be preferable to commodity money, such as 
metal coins. During the 19th century, many classical economists advocated rules 
of conduct to regulate the money supply in the hopes of ending intermittently 
occurring crises. The gold standard itself can be thought of as a sometimes 
stable monetary rule. A notable policy rule of the time is Walter Bagehot's rule 
for mitigating financial crises. The rule calls for a central bank to provide liquidity 
to financial institutions against collateral and at a penalty rate, essentially 
making the central bank a lender of last resort. This prescription is still quite 
relevant even today, as shown by recent events. Around the turn of the 20 th 
century Irving Fisher and Knut Wicksell, both important monetary theorists, 
proposed their own monetary rules. Wicksell's rule was an early version of an 
interest-rate rule that recommended adjusting interest rates solely in response 
to fluctuations in prices. Fisher advocated a compensated dollar rule, where the 
gold content of a dollar would be changed whenever price stability would 
require it. 
A more recent famous policy rule is Milton Friedman's constant money growth 
rule. The rule can be derived from a logarithmic version (as seen in Orphanides 
2007) of the equation of exchange
m v= p y ,  (1)
where p=π is inflation, m  is the growth rate of money, v is the growth rate 
of the velocity of money, and y is the growth rate of real output. Assuming that 
the velocity (circulation speed) of money is stable and fixing the growth rate of 
money at k percent ensures that nominal GDP will also grow at a stable rate of 
k percent. So, stable money growth also leads to economic stability. One 
8motivation for this rule was Friedman's suspicion of activist policy-making. 
Particularly when money velocity is stable enough this rule will be extremely 
robust and simple to implement (Orphanides 2007).  However, a money 
aggregate rule is problematic when money demand is unstable, and could lead 
to high interest rate volatility (Clarida et al. 1999, 52). In practice, it has become 
increasingly difficult to define monetary targets that are linked tightly enough 
with the ultimate policy goals. Therefore, their value for monetary policy has 
been questioned (Bean et al. 2010). Nowadays, a short-term interest rate is 
more often treated as the the main policy instrument to achieve policy 
objectives and the role of monetary aggregates has somewhat diminished, with 
the ECB perhaps being a partial exception. While earlier monetary theory did 
tend to describe monetary policy in terms of setting the money supply, this is not 
how central banks typically operate (Goodhart 2007). Of course, recent events 
have also lead to untypical policy operations that have not been limited to 
traditional interest rate policy.     
2.2 Classification of policy rules
2.2.1 Targeting rules
It is possible to divide modern policy rules into two classes that can both be 
used to characterize monetary policy. An alternative to instrument rules are 
targeting rules (see Svensson 1999; Svensson 2003), where the behavior of a 
central bank is determined by the objective function of an optimizing central 
bank that follows some specified target, while being constrained by the 
structural model of the economy. Those frameworks where a central bank has 
an intertemporal optimization problem can be considered the optimal control 
approach to decision-making, although targeting rules as advocated by 
Svensson (2003) are perhaps somewhat distinct in the sense that there is an 
emphasis on an announced target, as well as the allowance for the evolution of 
9policy judgment. Monetary policy is therefore discretionary, although targeting 
rules with commitment are also possible. In fact, they may be preferable 
because discretionary optimization can be suboptimal with forward-looking 
behavior. The target variable could be an inflation target, but there can be other 
targets, or multiple targets for that matter so that policy can be characterized as 
flexible inflation targeting in the terminology of Svensson (1999). The objective 
function that contains the relevant targets is the general targeting rule, or 
alternatively the targeting regime. After adding a structural model of the 
economy, the constrained optimization problem can be solved for the first-order 
conditions. A specific optimal targeting rule can then be derived from the first-
order conditions that will give the relationship between the target variables. It 
should also be noted that any reaction function implied by a targeting rule is 
subject to change whenever the model is updated. Svensson (2003) has 
advocated these types of rules as being a more realistic depiction of how 
inflation-targeting central banks actually conduct monetary policy. There is some 
debate on the relative merits of instrument and targeting rules that cannot be 
properly covered here (for a view that contrasts with Svensson 2003 see 
McCallum and Nelson 2005). One of the main issues with this framework is that 
the optimality property is quite sensitive to the model specifications (Giannoni 
and Woodford 2005). There are also practical difficulties with communicating 
such rules, since they can become very complicated. Woodford (2010) 
recommends searching for relatively simple and robust target criteria that would 
still be approximately optimal in more complex models. Optimal policy is thus 
generally any policy that is optimally derived from the objectives of monetary 
policy for a given model of the economy, although optimality can also 
sometimes be determined from the direction of the policy rule to the policy 
objectives.    
In addition to a central bank's discretionary policy regime, if the policymaker 
should be able to commit by some method, there will be a difference between 
commitment and discretion when forward-looking expectations are important 
(Woodford 2003). Discretionary policy will then cause a stabilization bias. This is 
because the ability to directly affect expectations, which can improve the 
10
outcome of policy, is not available when the policy is discretionary. 
To illustrate these differing policy frameworks in model form, the model of the 
economy first needs to be specified. This will be the basic New Keynesian 
model, which is the baseline model for many of the more complicated model 
frameworks used in monetary analysis. Since the New Keynesian model is 
highly prevalent in monetary policy and will appear in this paper with regularity, 
some of its main features will be described here. A characteristic feature of the 
New Keynesian framework is the presence of some form of price rigidity. Sticky 
prices or wages are what create the necessary friction for the short-term 
fluctuations that an economy exhibits. Typically, only a fraction of firms can 
adjust prices at any given period, which is known as a Calvo (1983) price-
setting scheme, though there can be different kinds of rigidities as well. The real 
interest rate can be affected by the central bank because prices are sticky. Price 
stickiness also means that output can deviate from a “natural” level. Other 
characteristic features are monopolistic competition among firms and a 
macroeconomic model that is derived from the optimizing behavior of individual 
actors, so that the model has microfoundations. Expectations about the future 
are also extremely important as the basic framework is entirely forward-looking. 
This means that inflation has no inertial component, though modified versions 
often add backward-looking components that result in a sort of hybrid model. 
The main channels, or transmission mechanisms, of monetary policy are a 
short-term real interest rate, and potentially expectational channels as well. The 
interest rate channel works through aggregate demand, and a short-term 
interest rate may feed through to long-term rates. Inflation expectations are the 
other standard channel of monetary policy.  
Instead of showing in detail how the equations of the macroeconomic model are 
derived from consumer and firm behavior, here they are merely presented in 
log-linearized form (details can be found in e.g., Galí 2002). The New 
Keynesian Phillips curve represents the aggregate supply of the economy. 
Inflation is a function of expected inflation and the output gap. The Phillips curve 
is derived from the pricing decisions of firms when they are faced with the 
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possibility of prices being fixed for some time. Firms thus set prices as a mark-
up over current and expected marginal costs. The output gap, which in a New 
Keynesian model is the deviation of output from its flexible price equilibrium, 
appears due to its relationship with real marginal cost. Expressed as an 
equation the New Keynesian Phillips curve is given by 
  
 t=E tt1 x te t ,  (2)
where, πt is inflation, x t is the output gap,  is a discount term,  is a  
coefficient that is closely linked to price rigidity and t denotes the time index. 
The cost shock term et makes policy more complicated as it forces a trade-off 
between the policy goals of inflation stabilization and output stabilization. 
Otherwise the central bank could achieve both at the same time. 
Aggregate demand is given by a forward-looking IS curve that is derived from 
an Euler equation condition for the household. It relates the output gap 
positively to the expected output gap and negatively to the the real interest rate. 
Sometimes, though not in this case, the brackets will also contain a term for the 
natural rate of interest so that the deviation of the real interest rate from the 
natural rate (an equilibrium rate) is important, as emphasized by Woodford 
(2003). The equation for aggregate demand is given by
x t=E t x t1− i t−E t t1ut ,  (3)
where   is a coefficient related to the intertemporal substitution of consumption, 
i t is the nominal interest rate and u t is a demand shock term.
Finally, the framework for the model is completed with a specification of 
monetary policy. In cases when it is not a postulated instrument rule, the optimal 
response is found by first solving the constrained optimization problem. 
Examples of the optimal frameworks under both commitment and discretion are 
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shown to better illuminate these approaches. The example for discretionary 
policy is taken from Clarida et al. (1999). The intertemporal loss function of the 
central bank is given by 
W=− 1
2
E t[∑i=0
∞
 i Lt].  (4)
The intertemporal loss function implies that the central bank wishes to minimize 
(in this case by maximizing (4) because of the negative sign)  the expected 
discounted sum of period losses. The loss function for a single period is given 
by
Lt=[ t
2x t
2] ,  (5)
 
where >0, which gives the relative weight placed on the output gap. This 
quadratic loss function implies that the central bank aims to minimize the 
squared deviations of inflation and output. Typically, something like (5) is the 
standard way to define the policy objectives of monetary policy, though the 
output gap here is specifically a deviation from a flexible price equilibrium. The 
literature on monetary policy has generally treated these policy objectives as 
pragmatic assumptions about policy preferences, but Woodford (2003) has also 
shown that a quadratic intertemporal loss function is an approximation of the 
welfare of a representative agent. 
Under discretion a central bank cannot affect private sector expectations about 
future inflation. In the case of (4) the central bank attempts to maximize this 
function by choosing x t , i t , t while taking expectations as given. The 
optimization problem can be solved by forming a Lagrangian function with the 
macroeconomic constraints of (2) and (3). Aggregate demand does not actually 
matter as a constraint as long as the non-negativity condition of the nominal 
interest rate never plays a constraining role. The optimization problem proceeds 
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in two stages. In the first stage, solving the first-order optimality condition for 
this set-up will lead to
x t=−t.  (6)
This is the optimal targeting rule. What this condition says is that demand is 
contracted when inflation is above target and vice versa when it is below target. 
The aggressiveness of this response depends inversely on  and positively on 
. The interest rate plays a role in that it is chosen to achieve the optimal values 
of inflation and output. With the optimality condition of (6) and the Phillips curve 
in (2) the equilibrium values of the target variables can then be solved. The 
optimal feedback rule for the interest rate is found by inserting the appropriate 
value of x t into the demand curve in (3).
  
The assumption in the above model has been that the central bank reacts 
immediately to the state of the economy. If the central bank needs to rely on 
forecasts for its decisions, as it generally probably does, the model needs to be 
amended with the central bank's forecasts of the future. Policy will then depend 
on those forecasts.
Instead of practicing discretionary policy, the central bank might be able to 
credibly commit its policy in some manner. This will have implications about the 
conduct of policy. With commitment the policymaker chooses its optimal plan 
and then promises to stick with it. Starting once more with the central bank's 
objective function and stating it this time as in Giannoni and Woodford (2005) 
W=E t 0[∑t=t0
∞
 t−t 0 Lt ],  (7)
  
where t 0 is some initial period. The period loss now takes the form
14
Lt= t
2x t
2 .  (8)
Now it is >0 that gives the relative weight of output. The decision problem 
involves finding the paths of x t , t to minimize the loss function while subject 
to the constraint of the supply curve in (2). Since the interest rate still has no 
relevant constraint it can be ignored as before. The solution proceeds in the 
same way as with discretion by forming a Lagrangian and solving for the first-
order conditions. These can be stated as 
t tt−1=0,  (9)
λ x t−κφt=0,  (10)
where φt is the Lagrange multiplier. These conditions hold for every period, 
except the initial one. In the first period the multiplier t−1=0 since there is no 
commitment requirement for the first period. The path of the Lagrange 
multipliers can also be solved. After that the evolution of output, inflation and the 
interest rate can be solved for as well. Unlike in the case of discretionary policy, 
commitment leads to the history dependence of policy. One way to see this is 
by the targeting rule found after eliminating the multiplier from the first-order 
conditions in (9) and (10) 
t

 x t−x t−1=0.  (11)
 
The optimal trade-off between the variables now depends also on the output 
gap of the previous period. This is the key difference between discretion and 
commitment; the discretionary policymaker will find that it is optimal to ignore 
what has happened before. It will find the condition in (6) every time it re-
optimizes. This makes optimal policy time-inconsistent, and the lack of history 
dependence can lead to a stabilization bias from discretionary policy. This bias 
is caused by discretionary policy lacking the stabilizing effect on expectations 
that commitment would have. The significance of the welfare gain from 
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commitment is discussed and quantified by Dennis and Söderström (2006). 
There are also timelessly optimal rules (Woodford 2003), which imply a slightly 
different form of commitment. In timelessly optimal rules the conditions of (9) 
and (10) hold for the initial period as well, with an implied commitment made in 
the past. 
 
What allows an optimal rule to improve on a simple rule? One reason is that the 
optimal rule is specifically designed to achieve an optimal trade-off between the 
objectives of monetary policy in the applicable macroeconomic model. Whether 
this advantage will actually lead to significant welfare gains is not entirely clear 
(Taylor and Williams 2010). Comparative results between simple and optimal 
rules will usually be rather model-dependent. An example of simple rules 
performing more or less optimally is in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). An 
additional advantage of the simple rules considered by Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (2007) is the minimal amount of information that is needed for actually 
implementing them, as the required macroeconomic indicators are mostly 
readily available. An example of a study where optimal policy can lead to some 
improvement is the Area Wide Model for the euro area (Dieppe et al. 2004). 
2.2.2 Instrument rules
Instrument rules commonly take a more direct approach to decision-making and 
are not necessarily derived from optimum conditions. One possible reason that 
fully optimal instrument rules are not considered that often is that they may be 
impracticable (Svensson 2003), at least when the complexity of the model 
increases significantly, so that a more feasible alternative would be some simple 
instrument rule. However, deriving optimal instrument rules is a viable enough 
approach, and such an approach is used in this study. It is also worth 
mentioning that distinctions between targeting and instrument rules are not 
necessarily always that important since a targeting rule implies an instrument 
rule. In any case, various Taylor-type rules are the most common class of 
16
simple rules with numerous variations. The word simple refers here to rules that 
only make use of some of the available information. Their simplicity, robustness, 
popularity, and empirical track record make them a practical choice for the 
purposes of this study. Because of the multiple variations that exist of the 
original rule, it is not always clear what exactly qualifies as a Taylor rule. Still, 
any simple interest-rate rule that adjusts to deviations from both an inflation and 
output target can probably be labeled a Taylor rule, or a Taylor-type rule to 
distinguish it from the original rule. One of the main reasons to use such a 
formula is that it is likely to be a good approximation for optimal policy (Galí 
2002). 
Some of the other advantages of these rules come from their simplicity and 
intuitiveness, although the simplicity has its drawbacks as well. It should not be 
expected that such simple formulations could be truly optimal policies for a 
central bank as emphasized by Svensson (2003), although they can be shown 
to be optimal instrument rules in some simple models, of which examples are 
shown later. One argument for using simple rules is that they may perform 
nearly as well as optimal rules (Taylor and Williams 2010; Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe 2007; Galí 2002). Another justification is that a useful policy rule should 
be quite robust across a wide range of models (Orphanides 2007). This means 
that a rule should perform well in a variety of macroeconomic models and not 
just one specific model; Taylor rules are typically viewed as quite robust in this 
way (Taylor and Williams 2010). The robustness can be tested by simulating 
rules in different models to find the rules that minimize output and inflation 
variation in multiple settings (Taylor and Williams 2010). The need for a robust 
rule comes from the uncertainty about how the economy actually works and 
hence the “correct” model, which makes robustness an inherently valuable 
property. Even though the rules are simple, they can often track actual policy 
closely and can provide a fairly readily available benchmark for monetary policy. 
On the other hand, a reliance on imprecisely measured concepts like potential 
output can be problematic.
17
3 Taylor-type rules
3.1 The original Taylor rule
John Taylor (1993) proposed a hypothetical monetary policy rule that became 
subsequently known as the Taylor rule. Taylor's now famous contribution sprang 
from research that had found that a promising policy rule responded to 
deviations from targets of both inflation and output. Taylor's rule has become 
widely used as a simple way to describe and evaluate monetary policy, though 
quite often in some modified way in an attempt to be more realistic. The original 
rule can be expressed by a simple equation
i=21
2
−21
2
y−y∗ ,  (12)
Where i is the short-term policy rate (in Taylor's paper the US Federal funds 
rate),  is the rate of inflation (here a GDP deflator over the previous four 
quarters) and y−y* is the output gap, or the percentage deviation of real output 
y from potential real output y*. Potential output is the long-run trend of an 
economy (or a flexible price equilibrium in New Keynesian models), so the 
output gap is a measure of slack in the economy. Taylor claimed that his rule 
was a good description of Federal Reserve policy between 1987-92.
It should be noted that Taylor's rule was not econometrically estimated. The 
parameters were chosen with plausible and rounded values in mind. The 
inflation target was assumed to be equal to 2, as was the equilibrium real 
interest rate (sometimes known as the natural rate). The coefficients for the 
inflation and output gaps were both 0.5. However, the logic of the rule does not 
require these particular values, and other values have also been considered 
(e.g., Taylor and Williams 2010). As well, there are many versions of Taylor-type 
rules with a better statistical fit than the original rule. Adding interest-rate lag 
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tends to improve the fit of a Taylor rule sizably, as can forecast-based inflation 
measures (for a statistical comparison of different rules in the case of the US 
Fed, see Fernandez and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy 2007). Generalized Taylor rules 
offer a potentially useful framework for econometric evaluation (Orphanides 
2007).   
In addition to being a good description of policy, Taylor also claimed that his rule 
could also be a good prescription for policy. This was mainly justified by model 
simulations and the good performance of monetary policy during this period. 
Taylor stressed, however, that a policymaker couldn't and shouldn't follow a rule 
mechanically. A simple algebraic rule cannot capture all the relevant information 
that a decision-maker can use when setting policy and the inevitable need for 
judgment. Rather, following a rule as a guideline implies a systematic and 
coherent approach to policy-making. 
Deviations from such a rule can be justified as reactions to special factors. A 
plausible reason for such discretion could be, for instance, a financial shock. 
Taylor himself gives the 1987 stock market crash as an example. A note of 
caution is appropriate here, though. As Svensson (2003, 28) states, there are 
no rules for when to deviate from a rule. The issue of discretionary policy has 
resurfaced again in the context of the recent financial crisis and the Fed's 
conduct before it. Taylor (2007) has argued that Fed policy was too loose before 
the crisis. This possibility will be briefly considered later in this paper.
A critical take on both Taylor rules and optimal rules as normative policy tools 
from a central bank's point of view can be found in ECB (2001). On the other 
hand, the description “rule-based, but not rule-bound” has been occasionally 
evoked by the ECB. In any case, no normative claims are made with the rules 
used in this paper. 
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3.2 Estimating a Taylor rule
Instead of assuming parameters, they can be estimated from data. A Taylor rule 
with unspecified parameters is given by
i t=r
∗ ta  t−
∗y y t−y
∗ ,  (13)
where r* is the equilibrium real interest rate, * is the inflation target. The 
weight a measures the sensitivity of the policy rate to the inflation gap, while y 
measures the sensitivity of policy to the output gap. Manipulating this equation 
slightly leads to equation
i t=r
∗∗1a t−
∗y y t−y
∗.  (14)
                                                         
Plugging Taylor's suggestion of a=0.5 into equation (4) yields
i t=r
∗+π∗+1.5 (π t−π
∗)+βy (y t−y
∗).  (15)
                                                                      
 
This implies that the nominal policy rate should adjust strongly (more than one-
for-one) to deviations from the inflation target. This is in accordance with the 
Taylor principle. Defining =1+a changes (14) into
i t=r
∗∗ t−
∗ y y t−y
∗.  (16)
                                                            
The Taylor principle requires that >1. The principle implies that the real 
interest rate is adjusted in response to inflation. This is important because it is 
the real interest rate that should have an effect on economic decisions. 
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To get a regression to estimate (16) can be reformulated as
i t=α+βππt+βy (y t−y
∗)+ϵt  (17)
Where =r*1−* is a constant and ϵt is an error term. Notably, because 
both r* and * are embedded inside the constant term, it is not possible to 
separately identify them without making some further assumptions.
3.3 Theoretical properties of the Taylor rule
Woodford (2001) has considered some of the theoretical properties of the 
original Taylor rule. One of the key points is that appropriate coefficients, like the 
ones chosen by Taylor, are sufficient to determine a rational expectations 
equilibrium price level. A rule that fulfills the Taylor principle can ensure that 
there is a unique stationary solution for output and inflation. The Taylor principle 
can also ensure that there are no inflationary spirals. These spirals could be 
driven by inflationary shocks that result in a lower real interest rate, which leads 
to higher expected inflation and in turn leads to a lower interest rate, and so 
forth. Since determinacy is quite important for interest-rate rules, and to make 
this determinacy condition more concrete, an example of a stabilizing rule will 
be shown for the canonical New Keynesian model. 
 
The first equation is the linearized forward-looking IS equation restated in a 
slightly different form as
x t=E t x t1− i t−E t t1−r t
n ,  (18)
where r t
n is the natural rate of interest. This emphasizes that monetary effects 
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on output work through the gap between the prevailing interest rate and the 
equilibrium rate. There is also no shock term in the IS curve this time. 
Aggregate supply is given by the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and it is written 
once more as
 t=E tt1 x te t  (19)
     
where  is a discount rate representing time preference,  is a coefficient, and 
et is a cost shock term. Monetary policy is set according to the rule
i t=r t
n+ϕπ πt+ϕx x t  (20)
Adding the policy rule into equation (18) yields an equation of the form
x t=E t x t1− tx x t−E t t1  (21)
This system that consists of equations (19) and (21) can then be written in 
matrix notation as
[1 0 ][E t x t1E t t1]=[1x − 1 ][ x t t][ 0−et ].  (22)
Multiplying both sides with the inverse of the matrix on the left while also using a 
more compact notation of (22) will lead to
E t z t1=A z tA1
−1et ,  (23)
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where A1
−1 is the inverted matrix and
A=[1 x  −−

1

],
is a matrix consisting of the coefficients of the model. This system is stable if 
and only if the number of eigenvalues of the matrix A that are outside the unit 
circle is equal to the number of forward-looking variables, which is two in this 
case. This is equivalent to a condition that the characteristic roots  of the 
characteristic equation of the matrix A are outside the unit circle. The 
characteristic roots can be found from 
det (A−λ I)=0,
where I is an identity matrix. Omitting some calculations, the stability condition 
will apply when

x 1−

1.  (24)
 
Taylor's suggested values satisfy this condition. Additionally, assuming that  is 
approximately equal to one means that then the inflation coefficient has to be 
more than one for the system to be stable. The stability condition of (24) will in 
this case reduce to approximately 1, which is just the Taylor principle once 
more. The stability conditions of various linear policy rules are considered more 
fully in Bullard and Mitra (2002). The stabilizing property of the Taylor principle 
in these theoretical models has made it of interest in empirical studies, as well. 
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Generally speaking, determinacy is not assured in the case of interest-rate 
policy, so it is quite a crucial issue. For instance, for purely forward-looking rules 
determinacy is not assured (Svensson and Woodford 2005). Even the standard 
result of the determinacy property of the Taylor principle has a number of 
qualifications. In particular, when steady state inflation is positive, the Taylor 
principle is not enough to ensure determinacy. Determinacy in the New 
Keynesian model can still be recovered with an additional response to output 
growth (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2009).
Finally, in Woodford's analysis the goals of inflation and output stability are also 
appropriate goals of monetary policy when they're correctly understood. Here, 
since this is analysis based on a New Keynesian framework, output stabilization 
means stabilization around a potential output corresponding to a flexible price 
equilibrium, which may not be equivalent with an empirical counterpart. Inflation 
is undesirable since it causes a dispersion of prices between goods, which in 
turn leads to a reduction in household welfare, as inflation will cause inefficient 
reallocation. Output fluctuations are undesirable because there is a preference 
for smoothed consumption. As mentioned earlier, an intertemporal loss function 
containing these policy goals  has been shown by Woodford (2003) to be an 
approximation of household welfare. Also, Svensson (1999) has argued that 
inflation and output gaps are widely recognized as the proper targets of 
monetary policy by both researchers and policymakers.    
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3.4 Optimal simple rules
Assuming that a central bank commits to a simple interest-rate rule, what would 
this rule be like? The optimally derived simple instrument rules presented in this 
section are from Svensson (2003). The central bank has an intertemporal loss 
function, where the loss function consists of the expected sum of discounted 
losses given by
E [1−∑n=0
∞
 Lt∣It ,z
t ] . (25)
Here E [·∣It ,z t ] denotes rational expectations about the economy given the 
central bank's information set It, as well as the bank's judgment term z t , while 
 is the discount factor and 1− is a scaling term for the discount factors.
The loss function for a single period is given by 
·
Lt=
1
2
[t−
∗2 x t
2 ]  (26)
Where  is the weight of output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization. As 
before, when >0 it means that the central bank has a flexible inflation target 
and places some weight on the output gap as well. The policy problem is to set 
the policy instrument, a short-term interest rate, in each period so that it 
minimizes the intertemporal loss function given the central bank's information 
set and its “judgment” .
  
The solutions for both a backward-looking model and a forward-looking model 
are showcased. These will lead to somewhat different results with different 
implications. In the backward-looking model expectations are modeled as 
adaptive expectations where aggregate supply is given by 
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 t1=t x x tz z t1t1 , (27)
where αx is a positive coefficient, zt+1 is a vector of exogenous variables, αz is 
a vector of coefficients and  is a cost shock term. The exogenous variables are  
additional determinants of the target variables that are unknown in period t. The 
idea is that they are additional information not present in a model that a central 
bank could still find useful when implementing policy. 
 
Aggregate demand is defined as
x t=βx x t+βz z t+1−βr (r t−r̄ )+ηt+1 .  (28)
Where r̄ is the average real interest rate, r=i t−πt+1∨t  is the short real 
interest rate and η is a demand shock.
For the forward-looking model, which is a variation of the basic New Keynesian 
model presented earlier, aggregate supply is given by
 t1 −= t2∣t −x x t1∣tz z t1t1 .  (29)
Here π=E (πt ) is average inflation and  zt+1 again gives the additional 
information unknown at time t. Aggregate demand in the forward-looking model 
is given by
x t+1=x t+2∣t −βr (i t+1∣t − πt+2∣t −r t+1
∗ )+ηt+1 ,  (30)
in which r t
∗ is the Wicksellian natural rate. 
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Simplifying this potentially complicated framework so that the response to the 
judgment term is ignored,  Svensson (2003) shows that the optimal decision 
rule for the backward-looking model is 
i t=r
∗∗11−c
xr
t −
∗x
1−c
r

 x
r
x t .  (31)
The inflation gap is contemporary in (31) because the forecast for inflation in the 
next period is predetermined. The rule itself is a Taylor rule where the 
coefficients are derived from model parameters.
The optimal decision for the forward-looking model is, when expressed in the 
same way as Gorter et al. (2008),
i t1=r t1, t
∗ ∗ t2, t −
∗
x
 t
 t1, t −
∗ 1
r
x t2, t .  (32)
The rule implies that in a forward-looking model forecasts are important for the 
current interest rate decision (or rather the announcement of the interest rate for 
the next period) of the central bank, so that policy decisions are based on the 
forecasts. Also, the rule is no longer necessarily that simple because of the 
forward-looking terms.
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4 Extensions and issues
4.1 Interest rate smoothing
When estimating policy rules, the rules are usually modified to take into account 
gradual adjustment of the policy rate. Empirical estimates find that a lagged 
interest rate is statistically significant and improves fit. In literature, this is a 
phenomenon that is variously called gradualism, inertia or interest rate 
smoothing. The gradual adjustment is typically modeled by
i t=1− i t
∗ i t−1 ,  (33)
where i t
∗ is a target rate given by the policy rule and  is the smoothing 
parameter. It is possible to have more complicated lag structures, but a single 
lag is the most common specification.
 
Adding the rule from (16)  into (33) will give
i t=1−r
∗∗1−  t−
∗1−y y t−y
∗ i t−1 .  (34)
  
To get an estimable function from (34) it is rewritten as
i t=(1−ρ)α+(1−ρ)βππt+(1−ρ)βy (y t−y
∗)+ρ i t−1+ϵt ,  (35)
  
with =r*1−* being a constant term.
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Rudebusch (2006) states that for quarterly data the smoothing parameter ρ is 
typically estimated to be around 0.8, which implies very slow adjustment. The 
case for the significance of ρ is strong, but explanations for it vary. Sack and 
Wieland (2000) look at a number of possible reasons for such behavior. First, 
forward-looking behavior implies that a small adjustment will be expected to be 
followed by later adjustments, which reduces the need for a large change in 
policy and decreases interest rate volatility. This means that smoothing can be 
advantageous in a forward-looking model (see also Woodford 2001). Second, 
data uncertainty may lead to cautious behavior by a policymaker, as data is 
likely to be revised later on. A third reason is parameter uncertainty, which 
involves uncertainty about the structure of the economy and the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. This uncertainty could induce policymakers to 
moderate their actions by gradual policymaking. Sack and Wieland (2000) 
argue that these issues can make central bank gradualism a sensible policy. 
Another possible justification for changing interest rates only gradually is a 
desire to reduce the volatility in financial markets that might be caused by policy 
actions. 
Rudebusch (2006), however, is critical of the idea that central banks actually 
practice gradualism over several quarters (but not of gradualism within a 
quarter). Rudebusch (2006) argues that the appearance of gradualism may be 
due to serially correlated shocks. That is, discretionary policy reacts to 
persistent economic shocks (omitted variables) that create an illusion of 
gradualism. Rudebusch (2006) also argues that if central bank policy is very 
inertial, it implies that policy should also be predictable. However, the yield 
curve, which relates interest rates to bond maturities, of interest rates shows 
little sign of such predictability. Financial markets apparently cannot predict 
future interest rates accurately enough given the gradualism of central banks. It 
is also possible that using revised data to explain real-time policy decisions 
accounts for the spurious gradualism (Lansing 2002). Another possibility is that 
the methods commonly used to estimate policy rules are flawed in the sense of 
containing weak instruments that cause gradualism to seem stronger than it 
actually is (Consolo and Favero 2009). This is tested by performing reverse 
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regressions that yield different results because of the weak instruments. 
It is possible to model serial correlation by
 
i t=1− i t
∗t  (36)
where et=Φet-1+εt  is an AR(1) error term that represents episodic shocks and Φ 
is a serial correlation parameter. English et al. (2003) combined the partial 
adjustment and serial correlation models to get a nested model that can be 
formulated as
Δ i t=(1−ρ)Δ it
∗+(1−λ)(1−ρ)(i t−1
∗ −it−1)+λρ Δ it−1+ϵt.  (37)
This model was also used to test between the two hypotheses and to find 
evidence of both partial adjustment and serial correlation in US data. This 
testing approach means manipulating the serial correlation and partial 
adjustment mechanisms in first differences so that it is possible to isolate a 
coefficient that can be used to test the null hypothesis of no partial adjustment. 
The rejection of the null implies that partial adjustment is also present. 
Castelnuovo (2007) has studied this issue with data for the euro area and finds 
a significant role for gradualism. While this can be used to test between the 
possible reasons for gradualism, Welz and Österholm (2005) note that the test 
may not be able to properly distinguish between them if there are relevant 
omitted variables.  
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4.2  Forward-looking rules
A forward-looking Taylor rule was popularized by Clarida et al. (1998). The 
results of their study will be summarized later in this paper, but  the forward-
looking rule they utilized is introduced in this section. Because it may take 
several quarters for monetary policy to have its full effect on the economy, and 
because it is probably a better representation of actual policy, forward-looking 
rules have become quite widely used in estimations of ECB reaction functions 
( e.g., Sauer and Sturm 2003; Fendel and Frenkel 2006), as well as other 
central banks. The rule in this case will be given by
i t=r
∗∗E t  tn−
∗y E t y tk−y tk
∗   (38)
where Et  denotes the expected deviation (based on the information set at time 
period t) of inflation n periods ahead, and  the expected deviation of the output 
gap k periods ahead. K may also equal zero, corresponding then to the 
expected output gap of the current period. The data used in this study implies a 
slightly different treatment of what the central bank knows in the current period, 
however. Since the data that is used is specifically designed to be part of the 
data that the policymakers had access to during monthly meetings, the 
contemporary values are treated as known values. Otherwise the treatment is 
similar to Clarida et al.(1998). The inflation target is constant. There is no clear 
consensus on what the appropriate forecast horizons are, though quite often the 
inflation forecast horizon is from six months to a year or more and the output 
horizon has similar or clearly shorter forecast horizon. It is assumed that there 
are no systematic forecast errors, which means that equation (38) can be 
rewritten in terms of realized variables. This kind of formulation is generally 
estimated with the two-stage least squares method or with the generalized 
method of moments because of the endogeneity of the realized variables. The 
estimation methods require choosing appropriate instrument variables so that 
the error term will be orthogonal to the instruments from the information set. 
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Typical candidates for instruments are the lags of inflation and output gaps, as 
well as the lags of other explanatory variables, as these are some likely sources 
for valid instruments.
Adding the forward-looking rule from (38) into the partial adjustment of (33) 
gives
i t=ρ i t−1+(1−ρ)(r
∗+π∗)+(1−ρ)[βπE t (π t+n−π
∗)+βy E t(y t+k−y t+k
∗ )] .  (39)
To get an equation that can be estimated from (39), it is rewritten in terms of 
realized variables as
i t= i t−11− 1− tn y 1−y tk−y tk
∗ t  (40)
and where  =r*1−*.  The error term consists of
t=−1−[tn−E t  tn y y tk−E t y tk ] ,  (41)
so that it is a linear combination of forecast errors and is therefore orthogonal to 
variables in the instrument set. This yields the orthogonality conditions that can 
be used in GMM estimation.  
Alternatively, using real-time forecast data, for example the central bank's own 
projections or possibly some survey as a proxy forecast, means that this 
framework is no longer necessary. However, central bank forecasts are only 
sometimes made publicly available, which is presumably why estimations based 
on forecasts have not been as common. The ECB does publish the Eurosystem 
staff forecasts biannually in its Monthly Bulletins, and in addition to those 
forecasts it also publishes complementary ECB staff forecasts. Yet another 
approach would involve replicating the central bank's forecasts as closely as 
possible by constructing forecasts from a real-time database. An example of this 
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kind of method for a variety of countries is Nikolsko-Rhzevskyy (2008). If no 
forecasts are available, then this could be a plausible alternative. On a final 
note, forecasts can be expected to have the advantage of containing far more 
information, as such forecasts are often likely to make use of a wide range of 
sources, perhaps also including central bank “judgment”. 
4.3 Measurement issues and speed limit rules 
The implementation of a policy rule as a policy or research tool requires specific 
knowledge about what is happening in the economy. Such data may not always 
be easily obtainable and can be subject to both measurement errors and 
revision. These problems can be  weakness of policy rules as the various 
issues with inputs weaken the empirical robustness of these rules. For instance, 
Kozicki (1999) finds that Taylor rules are not very robust when using alternative 
measures. 
There are alternative ways of measuring inflation and the best measure is 
subject to some debate. It's possible to focus on either headline inflation or on 
core inflation that excludes some particularly volatile components in an index. 
It's also possible to use inflation forecasts to get a forward-looking rule. There is 
sometimes uncertainty about the actual inflation target.
 
An especially acute problem is the measurement of the output gap that requires 
estimating potential output, which is not actually known. Methods for estimating 
potential output include, but are not limited to, fitting a linear trend to data, using 
a Hodrick-Prescott filter to obtain a smoothed trend, or using a structural model 
to get a measure of the output gap. It is also possible to use unemployment 
measures instead of production measures. Orphanides (2001) has argued that 
a reliance on imprecise real-time data of the output gap was a major cause of 
economic problems in the 1970s. Interest rates were kept too low by the Fed 
because of a systematically misjudged output gap. These measurement 
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problems still exist to this day. Additionally, analysis that relies on revised data 
may misrepresent actual policy by not taking into account the information that 
the decision-makers actually had in real-time. Unfortunately, real-time data is 
often difficult to acquire. This study, however, uses real-time data that is 
specifically designed to account for this problem, as well as real-time forecasts.
 
The equilibrium real interest rate also needs to be estimated and it may change 
over time (Woodford 2001). Such changes could lead to policy mistakes, as a 
change in the equilibrium real rate implies an equal change to the nominal 
policy rate. The values of all parameters in general could be expected to 
change over longer time periods. Some studies (e.g., Boivin 2006) try to take 
this kind of time variation into account by allowing the different coefficients to 
change over time.
The uncertainty about the level of the output gap provides an argument for 
responding to it with caution (Walsh 2004). Responding to a change in the 
output gap may be preferable to responding to its level. Although there are a 
few different versions of these types of rules, one general variant form 
Orphanides (2007) can be expressed as
i t=r
∗∗  t−
∗y y t−y t
∗ y  y t− y t
∗ ,  (42)
where y  denotes the parameter of the growth difference, yt   is output growth, 
and y t   is trend growth. Sometimes y can equal zero so that the output gap 
drops out of (42). This rule can be augmented with smoothing and forward-
looking behavior in a similar manner as with the earlier examples. Adding a 
partial adjustment mechanism and defining parameters appropriately would 
mean that (42) collapses into a formula stated entirely in first differences, which 
would avoid the problems with unobserved variables such as the natural 
interest rate (see Orphanides 2007). The variants that are based on output 
growth are sometimes called “speed limit” rules and they are a fairly popular 
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alternative, particularly since forecasts usually only report projections for GDP 
growth. 
The reasoning for estimating speed limit rules is two-fold. First, output growth is 
more readily known than the output gap. Second, a response to output growth 
can also help recover determinacy (a unique rational expectations equilibrium 
for a New Keynesian macroeconomic model as shown earlier) with positive 
trend inflation. The usual Taylor principle result no longer ensures determinacy 
with a positive steady state inflation rate, but determinacy can be recovered with 
an additional response to output growth (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2009).  
4.4 The zero nominal bound
Since the zero bound on interest rates has become a more pressing issue 
lately, its implications are also briefly covered. Monetary policy can be 
constrained because nominal interest rates can't fall below zero since cash will 
always offer a guaranteed return of zero. While monetary policy may or may not 
be rendered ineffective in such a situation, the usual tool of interest rate 
adjustment is no longer available. Central banks may still wish to lower real 
interest rates further, but they can no longer achieve this by lowering nominal 
rates, and are therefore in a liquidity trap. This dilemma has become a more 
acute concern after Japan's experience of prolonged deflation and the near-
zero rates in the United States and elsewhere have turned the bound into a 
relevant issue. In fact, many of the major central banks are as of this writing 
near the zero bound. As an example of the zero bound problem, Rudebusch 
(2009) used an estimated rule to forecast the Fed funds rate during the worst 
period of the economic crisis. The forecast implied that rates as low as negative 
5 % would be needed. The inadequacy of interest rate policy has led to 
experimentation with policies such as quantitative easing and credit easing. The 
Fed and other central banks have engaged in a massive expansion of their 
balance sheets to enable the supply of liquidity (echoes of the Bagehot rule) 
and to bring down credit spreads. At the same time such a situation may require 
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monetary policy to function mostly through expectational channels, perhaps by 
promising an extended period of low rates. In practice policy has also consisted 
of unusual and sometimes experimental actions.
The constraint has implications for policy as well, in that models now contain an 
explicit constraint where the interest rate cannot take negative values. There 
are various proposals to modify policy rules so as to avoid the zero bound 
situation. One way of handling this problem would be adjusting rules to avoid 
hitting the lower bound (Taylor and Williams 2010). One solution could be to 
respond more aggressively to output gaps. Another possibility is more 
aggressive policy in the vicinity of the zero bound. The interest-rate cuts that 
happened during the recent crisis could be understood in this way (Walsh 
2009). Also, for theoretical reasons a price-level target might be desirable to 
lessen the impact of the zero bound (Walsh 2009). A price level target can be 
advantageous when expectations are forward-looking, as it can have an 
automatically stabilizing effect. Finally, a higher inflation target could give 
monetary policy more room to maneuver before reaching the zero bound, 
though this would lead to a trade-off with the costs of higher inflation. It should 
also be remarked that Benhabib et al. (2001) have pointed out that the Taylor 
principle that was earlier shown to avert inflationary spirals may not stop an 
economy from falling into a liquidity trap. In this scenario the economy can end 
up in a deflationary steady state at the zero nominal bound. Nakov (2008) has 
looked at the welfare effects of the zero bound on different monetary policy 
rules in a stochastic general equilibrium model. To summarize this study, a 
central bank with optimal commitment can credibly promise low rates in the 
future, while a discretionary policymaker cannot. In fact, discretionary policy 
now has a deflationary bias, which implies average inflation that is below its 
target value and that is caused by the inability to affect expectations when the 
zero bound constraint is binding. Simple Taylor rules lead to higher welfare 
losses from both the zero bound and their sub-optimality, but the zero bound will 
be met only very rarely under such a rule.  
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5 Empirical research and discussion
5.1 General research
The studies mentioned in this chapter constitute only a very small part of an 
extensive literature that has involved the estimation of policy rules for most of 
the central banks that have operated in the recent past. Even though the 
studies that estimate the parameters for an entire dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model are ignored in this chapter, the coverage of literature is still 
not even close to comprehensive. To begin with, Carare and Tchaidze (2005) 
offer a very useful critique of the practice of estimating policy rules and draw 
attention to many of the issues involved in their estimation. They also use 
simulations to study the effects of the incorrect specification of policy rules.   
  
Judd and Rudebusch (1997) estimated separate reaction functions for three of 
the four Fed Chairmen that served during 1970–1997. The Chairmen were 
Arthur Burns (1970–1978), Paul Volcker (1979–1987) and Alan Greenspan 
(1987–1997). Judd and Rudebusch hypothesized that a change in Chairman 
was a likely source of a change in the Fed's reaction function. 
The study initially compared Taylor's own specifications with actual policy and 
found that the Greenspan era conformed quite well with the original rule, while 
the Burns period and the Volcker period seemed to consistently deviate from 
the specified rule. During the Burns period the Fed funds rate tended to be 
lower than the recommended rule, and during the Volcker period the funds rate 
tended to be higher than recommended by the rule. This may highlight differing 
attitudes to inflation during these periods.
The estimations were divided into three sub-samples and allowed for the 
gradual adjustment of policy. The estimation for the Greenspan period had a 
fairly good statistical fit. However, the coefficient for the output gap was twice 
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the size of Taylor's recommendation. Policy also seems to have been marked 
by gradual adjustment. 
 
The regression for the Volcker period implies a response to a change in the 
output gap that cannot be statistically rejected. The coefficient of the inflation 
gap is close to Taylor's assumption. The estimation is less precise than the 
Greenspan version. This may be due to the high inflation at the time, or due to 
experimentation with operating procedures. The Burns period has a coefficient 
for the inflation gap that is not statistically significant. The implication is that the 
Taylor principle did not hold during this time. Policy appears to have responded 
gradually to economic activity and may have overestimated potential output.
Clarida et al. (1998) estimated reaction functions for several major central 
banks in an attempt to characterize monetary policy since 1979. They used a 
forward-looking Taylor rule with smoothing for this purpose and studied the 
central banks of Japan, the US, the UK, Germany, France, and Italy. 
Summarizing the results, there seemed to be a lot of consistency in the policies 
of the central banks. A workable policy responds strongly to inflation with some 
room for output stabilization. Inflation targeting is another key component in this 
period of policy-making. It is these kinds of studies that suggest that the Great 
Moderation (a time of globally reduced economic volatility that began in the 
1980s) may have been partly due to better monetary policy since the early 
1980s. Clarida et al. (2000) concentrate solely on Fed policy and divide it into 
two sub-samples of 1960–1979 and 1980–1996, and they find similar results to 
the earlier studies. The Fed's response to inflation is weak before Volcker's 
period, and a higher inflation target doesn't seem to account for the differences 
in policy between these two periods.
One caveat of note is that these studies made use of current data instead of the 
original data that policymakers had. As has been mentioned earlier, this can 
have an effect on results. Orphanides (2001) has argued that instead of having 
an overly lax response to inflation policymakers misjudged the capacity of the 
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economy at the time. The potential for misleading inference from revised data is 
a reason to rely on real-time data when it is possible. That is why real-time data 
is used in this thesis at all times.
Boivin (2006) also analyzes the question of historical changes in the monetary 
policy of US monetary policy. Notably, all parameters are allowed to be time-
varying. This allows finding gradual changes in policy not necessarily captured 
by a split sample approach. This study again suggests that the response to 
inflation was weak in the late 1970s while strong otherwise with significant 
overall shifts in conduct by the early 1980s. The results suggest that changes in 
monetary policy coincided with improvements in economic performance and 
therefore may have been one reason for this improvement.
There are many other studies for other central banks. To mention just a few, for 
the UK there is a study by Nelson (2003) and for Sweden a paper by Berg et al. 
(2004). Dolado et al. (2005) study the the possibility of central banks having 
asymmetric preferences, where the nonlinearity is derived from a nonlinear 
Phillips curve. They find some evidence for asymmetry for European central 
banks before the time of the monetary union, but there is less evidence of this 
for the US Fed. An explanation for this finding may be greater labor market 
rigidities in Europe. A different example of non-linearity is considered by Taylor 
and Davradakis (2006), where the reaction function can switch to another form 
depending on the state of the economy. A slightly different approach is taken by 
Boinet and Martin (2008). Here the reaction function is nonlinear to take into 
account the potentially zone-like preferences and asymmetrical responses of 
the central bank. Boinet and Martin find that a nonlinear rule does better than a 
standard Taylor rule for the UK. An estimated monetary rule for South Africa 
(Naraidoo 2010) also makes use of this model. The model is of particular 
interest because it is used in this study as well. 
39
5.2 Estimated reaction functions for the ECB
Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) estimated a standard Taylor rule and a forward-
looking rule over the period 1990–1998 for countries that decided to join the 
European monetary union. They found that average interest rates in the EMU 
area closely followed a Taylor rule, except during the exchange rate turmoil in 
1992–93. The purpose of the study was to see how much the ECB, if it 
employed a Taylor rule, would deviate from the average behavior of member 
states. They concluded that policy would not change by much, though the 
constructed “central bank” is rather artificial.
Sauer and Sturm (2003) have done an extensive study to estimate rules for the 
ECB. They note that some of the early studies on this subject found that the 
Taylor principle didn't seem to apply for the ECB. Using a standard rule they find 
similar evidence. Adding forward-looking behavior to the regressions changes 
the results so that the Taylor principle seems to hold. This could mean that the 
ECB focuses on near-term projections of the economy. There is also evidence 
of partial adjustment. Using real-time data as opposed to revised data does not 
seem to make much difference here.
Ullrich (2003) compares the Fed and the ECB with Taylor-type reaction 
functions. One finding is that ECB policy seems to be affected by the decisions 
of the Fed, but not vice versa. The coefficient for inflation is below one for the 
ECB.
Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003) have done a fairly extensive set of estimations 
for the period lasting from 1985 to 2002. The inflation coefficient generally in a 
range between 1.5-2 in most estimations. This is true for contemporary, 
backward-looking and forward-looking variants. They also note that when using 
industrial production the output coefficient is slightly lower than with GDP. 
Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2004) have an additional study, but this time also 
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utilizing real-time data and forecasts from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters. They find that the forecasts seem to provide the most accurate 
estimates for real-time data. Also, real-time estimates differ from those with 
revised data. 
Hayo and Hofmann (2005) have done a comparison of the ECB and the 
German Bundesbank to find out how similarly the two central banks have 
conducted monetary policy. There is a common perception of the ECB broadly 
inheriting the legacy of the Bundesbank and particularly the Bundesbank's 
emphasis on price stability. They find that the ECB and the Bundesbank 
respond in similar ways to expected inflation, but the ECB responds more 
strongly to the output gap, though this may be due to structural differences.    
Fendel and Frenkel (2006) took stock of the first five years of the ECB by 
estimating forward-looking rules. They find the general result that smoothing is 
significant and improves fit. The Taylor principle seems to hold and the 
parameter for the output gap is significant for a variety of different slack 
measures. The model fit is quite good, though the sample is short. They 
estimate the inflation target, which is consistent with the stated target. They find 
no clear link with money growth and interest-rate setting, though the ECB uses 
a monetary aggregate as a reference value.
One caveat that should be mentioned about most of these early studies is the 
shortness of the sample period, as the time frame is not much more than a few 
years at most. Sometimes the short time frame has meant employing a 
synthetic central bank for the years prior to 1999 to achieve a longer time 
period. Considering the potential changes in monetary policy and the differing 
preferences of policymakers, such estimates may not be entirely reliable.
A study by Surico (2007) is an example of nonlinear reaction function estimated 
for the ECB. Here, the nonlinear rule is due to an asymmetric response by the 
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central bank to fluctuations above and below the targets. The main results are 
that the response to output is asymmetric, in that responses to downturns are 
stronger than responses to upturns, and that the response to inflation is 
symmetrical. Additionally, the money aggregate does not seem to be an actual 
target variable for the ECB when added to the nonlinear model.
Gorter et al. (2008) is a study that is of some interest because it employs data 
constructed from Consensus Economics forecasts. This means that the study 
has results that offer a fairly close comparison to the forecast-based estimations 
in this study. They find that the forecasts seem to be useful for analyzing ECB 
policy and are superior to contemporary estimates. They also employ a more 
complicated error structure by incorporating serially correlated shocks.
    
One of the most recent studies is by Gerlach and Lewis (2010), who consider 
the possibility that the crisis has affected the policy of the ECB. This study 
argues that there is evidence for a change in the ECB's reaction function so that 
the policy response has been more aggressive than usual, though there are 
other interpretations for this as well, such as a potentially nonlinear reaction 
function.
Forte (2010) estimates Taylor rules for the ECB, the US Fed and the Bank of 
England. This study is an example of rules estimated in first differences, and the 
results and methods are fairly similar to another recent study by Aastrup and 
Jensen (2010). These studies are of interest because they share a similar time 
frame with the estimations in this paper. The results of the studies are also 
broadly speaking similar to some of the results found later with the forward-
looking rules despite some other differences in the estimation approach. Both 
Aastrup and Jensen (2010) and Forte (2010) find that output and 
unemployment measures seem to most clearly account for the interest-rate 
policy of the ECB.     
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5.3 The recent financial crisis
While there is no shortage of explanations for the crisis that began in 2007, 
John Taylor has argued that loose monetary policy was an important 
precipitating factor in the crisis (e.g. Taylor 2007). Taylor (2007) claims that the 
Fed's policy between 2001-2006 was a major deviation from usual practice, as 
shown by the Taylor rule. This was an unusually significant period of discretion 
in both the length of time and size. The discretionary period partly coincided 
with a housing boom. With higher interest rates the boom might have been 
significantly weaker (based on a simulated housing model by Taylor) and the 
eventual financial fallout would have been less severe. Fed Chairman Bernanke 
(2010) has responded to this criticism and argued that monetary policy was not 
a significant factor in causing the crisis. Policy was motivated by a weak 
recovery and a fear of imminent deflation. Bernanke points rather to global 
imbalances, regulatory failures and distorted incentives in the financial sector as 
some of the main factors leading to the build-up of the crisis.  Also, a study by 
Orphanides and Wieland (2008) suggests that the actual discretionary period 
and its significance depends quite a lot on the inflation measure that is used as 
well as how the yardstick rule is formulated.  
6 ECB policy
This chapter briefly covers some of the general features and principles of the 
operation of the ECB. The ECB was established in 1998 and took responsibility 
of monetary policy in the beginning of the following year; this was the 
culmination of the second stage of the convergence process for member states 
that decided to join a monetary union. After expanding over time, most recently 
with the inclusion of Estonia, the euro area now consists of 17 member states. 
The main objective of the ECB as defined in EU treaties is the maintenance of 
price stability, with high employment and stable growth being secondary goals 
that cannot take precedence over its main objective. To carry out this task 
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unhindered the ECB has been granted a great amount of independence for 
greater credibility in accomplishing its main objective. The ECB originally 
defined price stability as an annual change in the HICP of below two percent 
over the medium term. In 2003 price stability was further clarified as meaning a 
below, but close to, two percent inflation rate. A comprehensive, if perhaps no 
longer completely up-to-date, description of the policy framework can be found 
in ECB (2004).
 
Some of the general principles of ECB's monetary strategy include: the 
importance of anchoring inflation expectations, the need for forward-looking 
policy, focusing on the medium run, and a broad-based appraisal of the 
economy. In addition, the ECB has a two-pillar strategy for achieving price 
stability. The first pillar involves economic analysis to evaluate price 
developments. The second pillar is monetary analysis, where a broad money 
aggregate M3 is used as a reference value. The emphasis on the role of a 
monetary aggregate makes the ECB stand out somewhat from other central 
banks. 
The ECB employs a corridor system of policy rates within which market rates, in 
particular the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) rate, tend to move. This 
corridor consists of deposit and lending facilities that determine the floor and the 
ceiling, and between them is the Main Refinancing Operation (MRO) rate. This 
is the main policy rate that the market rates usually closely track. The MRO rate 
is determined by open market operations, which may sometimes involve the 
outright purchase and sale of assets, but which most often involve temporary 
repo and reverse repo agreements to adjust the amount of liquidity as needed.
Since the recent crisis has been the biggest test for the ECB so far, its policy 
actions for that time are also briefly sketched. The financial crisis that began in 
2007 and the following economic contraction have induced central banks to 
react with unusual force and with unorthodox methods, even including 
coordinated policy actions. It is quite likely that some reappraisal of the 
44
monetary framework will result from these events, particularly in respect to the 
role of financial markets and the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy 
(e.g., Bean et al. 2010). In any case, the ECB has engaged in the provision of 
liquidity in addition to the more typical interest rate policy to counter the 
weakened connection between policy and market rates and to end the 
dysfunction in loan markets. While the policy rates have been reduced to a 
historically low level, there have also been various programs started under the 
moniker of “enhanced credit support”. The MRO rate has become a fixed rate 
and the refinancing operations offer essentially unlimited liquidity to a bidder 
with adequate collateral. Longer-term loan operations have also been increased 
and a wider range of assets are accepted as collateral. The Eurosystem's 
balance sheet has grown significantly to facilitate these liquidity programs. The 
stated intention with these measures is that they are temporary and will be 
phased out in time. More recently it has been bond markets, and in particular 
those dealing with government bonds, that have been under great strain. This 
has resulted in the ECB playing a role in debt security markets. 
7 Data
This section presents details of the data that has been used for this paper. Most 
of the time series data has been collected from a real-time database for the 
euro area, which has data in monthly, quarterly, and annual intervals. The 
database has been constructed from data published in ECB Monthly Bulletins 
and is available in the ECB Statistical Warehouse, as well as in the Euro Area 
Business Cycle Network website. This database is a very useful source of data 
because it is the information, although only a part of it, that the Governing 
Council receives in time for its first monthly meeting, and before actual policy 
decisions are made for the month (Giannone et al. 2010). As has been stressed 
by Orphanides (2001) in particular, real-time data can be quite important in this 
kind of analysis.
45
For the forecast-based estimations there were two main possibilities. The ECB 
website has a Survey of Professional Forecasters, which could  be used as a 
proxy forecast; it has been used for this purpose by Gerdesmeier and Roffia 
(2004). The Survey could have been one source for forecasts, but the forecasts 
that are used here are the semi-annual economic projections produced by the 
Eurosystem staff. These forecasts are made available to the Governing Council 
before it meets in June and December, and they are published in ECB Monthly 
Bulletins during these months. They have the appealing feature of being 
information that is directly available to the Governing Council. A clear problem 
with these projections is the very limited number of observations that are 
available, as there are just 20 periods of data in total since December 2000. 
Keeping this limitation in mind, the forecasts could still be helpful in uncovering 
the inflation strategy of the ECB. To try to counteract the paucity of forecasts the 
ECB staff forecasts are employed as additional data. They are based on a 
similar method, though their role in policy decisions is unclear. The forecasts 
report projections of average annual HICP inflation and real GDP growth. There 
are projections for the current year and the next year, and the forecasts are 
reported in a range due to uncertainty involving such forecasts. The mid-point 
values of the forecast range are used in the estimations. The staff forecasts 
may also have the advantage of outperforming outside forecasts, as a central 
bank can be expected to have access to a lot of information. 
The sample period for the estimations runs from January 1999 to June 2009, 
with some additional data that accounts for lag terms, forward-looking terms as 
well as an extended sample for industrial production. An artificial central bank 
created by weighted averages of data before the time of the monetary union 
would allow for a longer sample period, but this approach, while used in multiple 
early studies, is somewhat questionable. This kind of consistency in reaction 
functions may not be warranted, and with over ten years of data it is not quite so 
necessary anymore. The forecasts, on the other hand, run from December 2000 
to June 2010 in six month intervals. Adding the ECB staff forecasts means that 
a quarterly frequency is possible after June 2004.    
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The interest rate that is used as the policy variable is the EONIA rate, as it is a 
market rate that the ECB has a close influence on, and it is also comparable to 
the Fed funds rate in the United States. The official ECB policy rates can be 
problematic as they exhibit minimal variation over time. A short-term EURIBOR 
rate would also be a possible alternative, but the turmoil in financial markets 
since 2007 may have made these rates unreliable. The drastic increase in the 
EURIBOR-OIS spread (the OIS rate is an overnight indexed swap rate and is a 
nearly risk-free rate) during the worst moments of the crisis weakened the 
connection of market rates to official policy rates. The persistent spread may be 
a problem since it disengages the connection between policy rates and market 
rates. The EONIA rate, while volatile, has stayed mostly in line with the policy 
rates during the crisis, so it will be the only interest rate that will be utilized. The 
EONIA rate is also the most widely employed choice of interest rate in the 
literature.
The inflation index is the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), which 
is the official target index for the ECB. However, a HICP that excludes food and 
energy is also used. This can be considered a rough measure of core inflation, 
which could make it more useful for a medium-term focus. The general idea 
with core measures is that volatile components subject to temporary price 
shocks are stripped away to get a better idea of the underlying trend. It is not 
clear if core measures play any large role for the ECB, but they are employed 
here as an additional check. The overall HICP is already directly available in 
annual percentage changes, but the “core” HICP measure is calculated as a 
year-to-year percentage change in the index. Neither measure is seasonally 
adjusted.
The output gap is somewhat problematic and it could be measured in several 
ways, but options are rather limited for monthly data. The conventional choice is 
a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is that is applied to an Industrial Production Index 
as a smoothing method. This method is used to separate the trend component 
from the cyclical component. The output gap is calculated as a percentage 
deviation of output from the trend. The chosen Industrial Production Index 
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excludes construction and is seasonally adjusted. The smoothing parameter 
that is used is λ=14400, as is standard for monthly data. There is, as is 
sometimes noted (Mise 2005), a so-called end-point problem with using the HP 
filter that leads to an exaggerated role for the end-points of the series. To 
account for this, a forecast has been made with an ARIMA model for twelve 
additional months of industrial production and the beginning date for the Index 
is stretched all the way to January 1994 before the HP filter is applied to it.
Since the models as they are formulated leave out potentially useful indicator or 
even target variables that might have explanatory power, various plausible 
candidates have sometimes been proposed and explored. Some of these have 
included: M3 (a broad money aggregate), a stock index variable and an 
exchange rate variable. A risk spread variable could be potentially interesting as 
well, but most of these additional variables will not be considered any further in 
this thesis. Aastrup and Jensen (2010) is an example of a study that employs a 
far more comprehensive set of variables in their estimations. The growth in M3 
has been perhaps the most consistently, though still only intermittently, 
statistically significant additional variable for the ECB, and certainly the most 
often studied additional variable. Therefore, it is the one additional variable 
considered in this study. The variable is constructed by taking the monthly M3 
growth and subtracting from that rate an announced reference value of 4.5%. 
Most of the literature argues for and maintains the assumption of the stationarity 
of the relevant variables (e.g., Clarida et al. 2000; Dolado et al. 2005),  though a 
few studies (Aastrup and Jensen 2010; Forte 2010) do use variables in first 
differences.  
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8 Estimation
8.1 Estimation method
There are a number of considerations in choosing the estimation method. 
Instead of the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method the 
estimations in this paper are mostly carried out with the generalized method of 
moments estimator originally proposed by Hansen (1982). The discussion of the 
properties of GMM in this section is based on Baum et al. (2003), Hamilton 
(1994) and Hayashi (2000). 
GMM can be considered a generalization of some other common estimation 
methods, such as OLS, and can be used to estimate both linear and nonlinear 
models. It is frequently employed as a means of handling potentially 
endogenous variables. When estimating a regression with OLS it is assumed 
that any independent variables are uncorrelated with the error term. GMM or 
some other method is called for whenever there is a situation where the error 
term is not independent of the regressors, but instead varies with them. The 
failure of the regressors to be exogenous variables will make OLS estimates 
biased. The endogeneity problem often arises in a simultaneous system of 
multiple equations. A classic example of this are models of supply and demand. 
A regression containing price and quantity as variables will not be able estimate 
either a demand curve or a supply curve because the variables are jointly 
determined by both supply and demand. The forward-looking rules that rely on 
rational expectations also exemplify the endogeneity issue, since they include 
future realized economic variables that determine the current policy rate, while 
these economic variables are in turn affected by past policy decisions, and are 
therefore endogenous. Since almost all of the regressions that are carried out 
are forward-looking, it becomes necessary to account for the endogenous 
variables.
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One way of handling this so-called simultaneity bias is by using an appropriate 
set of instruments. These instruments need to be exogenous and at the same 
time need to be correlated with the explanatory variables. An estimation method 
with instruments is called two-stage least squares, or sometimes the 
instrumental variables (IV) method. GMM also makes use of instruments that 
provide the necessary moment conditions, but it has the advantage of being 
efficient in comparison to IV estimation when the errors are heteroskedastic, 
though the advantage is lost if there is in fact no heteroskedasticity. Still, even 
under homoskedasticity GMM is asymptotically no worse than the IV estimator. 
The small-sample performance of GMM may sometimes be poor, however. 
Either linear or nonlinear least squares estimation should be sufficient, if 
contemporary regressors can be treated as exogenous, but this is a rather 
ambiguous call to make. For example Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003) found that 
OLS estimates seem to have been biased in the case of contemporary 
estimations, and it is not the only such study to reach this conclusion (also 
Surico 2007). This may be because of the data used in those particular studies. 
The data used in this paper should allow treating contemporary variables as 
exogenous. Therefore, estimations containing only current-period regressors 
are treated as exogenous and estimated with OLS, but also by the GMM 
methodology as a precaution. Still, in most cases the information set of the 
central bank is allowed to contain current period inflation, output gaps and other 
explanatory variables. However, to try to minimize issues with serially correlated 
errors, the instrument sets generally begin from t-2 or later. This is a similar to 
the approach taken by Surico (2007). All the GMM and OLS estimations are 
also carried out with a Newey-West standard error correction for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) of unknown form as suggested by 
Newey and West (1987). These choices follow the approach taken by the 
majority of previous studies since both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
are a concern in most of these studies.    
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Central to GMM estimation is the (L x 1) moment function for a set of observed 
variables v t given in the most general form by
E (g (v t ,β))=Eg t(β)=0,
where these moment conditions, or orthogonality conditions, are fulfilled at the 
true value of , which is a vector of K unknown parameters. Additionally, 
identification requires that L ≥ K. The variables need to satisfy ergodicity and 
stationarity assumptions with some additional technical assumptions for the 
moments (see Hayashi 2000, chapter six). The general principle in estimating 
forward-looking reaction functions is that the error term ϵt is a linear 
combination of forecast errors so that it is orthogonal to variables in the central 
bank's information set at the time when (rational) expectations are formed. A 
vector of L observable instruments Z t from the information set have 
orthogonality conditions of the following form
E (ϵt Z t)=0,
where the expected crossproducts of the errors and the instruments are zero. It 
should also be noted that 
ϵt=y t−f (x t ; β) ,
where f(.) is a linear or nonlinear model. 
GMM chooses the estimator for the model parameters so that the sample 
moment conditions, which are based on population moment conditions, are 
fulfilled as closely as possible. This is done by minimizing an objective function 
based on the moment conditions. Generally this is achieved by a weighting 
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matrix that determines how the individual moment conditions are weighted to 
best achieve the moment conditions, as it is not usually possible to fulfill the 
sample moment conditions exactly. The sample equivalent of the population 
moment conditions is given by
ḡ (β)=1
n ∑t=1
n
g t (β) ,
which in this case implies
ḡ (β)=1
n ∑t=1
n
ϵt Z t ,
where n is the number of observations. The task is to select a  of  that sets 
the moment conditions close to zero by minimizing a quadratic objective 
function.  
 
The GMM objective function that is minimized is
min J (β)=ḡ (β)' W ḡ (β) ,  (43)
where W is a L x L symmetric positive definite weighting matrix. While W could 
be chosen from any number of weighting matrices, efficiency requires the use of 
an optimal weighting matrix. In practice the weighting matrix is an asymptotically 
consistent estimate of an optimal weighting matrix so that Ŵ →pW as n tends 
to infinity. Sometimes the sample size n is also added to (43) as a multiplier, as 
it will later be used to test the overidentifying restrictions and the minimization 
problem itself is not affected by a constant term. Regardless, a GMM estimator 
of the true parameter vector  is the  that minimizes J (β) , which can be 
found from the first order conditions
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∂J (β)
∂β
=0.
The GMM estimator is asymptotically normally distributed. Under certain 
conditions the GMM estimator will be the same as the OLS estimator, or the 
same as the IV estimator, or a number of other estimators. As an example of 
this generality, the connection between OLS and GMM has been made use of 
for the OLS estimations in this paper. When the instruments for GMM estimation 
are defined as just the explanatory variables (and that are therefore treated as 
exogenous variables) of the model, then OLS is an exactly identified GMM 
estimator. The key condition in this case is that
E (ϵt Z t)=E (ϵt x t )=E [(y t−x t ' β)x t]=0,
where x t is a vector of K explanatory variables so that K=L. It is possible to 
derive the OLS estimator as a special case of GMM under these conditions. 
This connection is utilized to get a standard error correction for OLS that 
accounts for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
In the overidentified case of L > K the choice of weighting matrix becomes 
important. The optimal weighting matrix that is required for efficiency minimizes 
the asymptotic variance of the GMM estimator. Hansen (1982) has shown that 
this lower bound is achieved with a weighting matrix that is the inverse of the 
covariance matrix of moment conditions. That is, the optimal choice of weighting 
matrix converges in probability to S−1 .  The asymptotic covariance matrix S is 
given by
S= lim
(N →∞)
( 1
N
)∑
t=1
N
∑
j =−∞
∞
E (ϵt ϵt− j Z t Z t− j
' ) ,
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and by setting
W=S−1 ,
gives the efficient GMM estimator. A consistent estimator Ŝ of the long-run 
covariance matrix S yields an asymptotically efficient GMM estimator. So while 
the optimal weighting matrix is not known, it can be consistently estimated. As 
emphasized by Hayashi (2000), to get a good estimate of the optimal weighting 
matrix the sample size may need to be quite large.
The estimate for the covariance matrix would simplify if the residuals were 
serially uncorrelated and homoskedastic. When these assumptions do not hold 
the estimate of the covariance matrix needs to take into account the 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the errors. This correction is 
achieved by constructing a HAC estimator for S, which can be accomplished 
with a kernel-based approach. This entails the choice of both a kernel ω j and 
a bandwidth parameter bT .
The covariance matrix has the property that it is absolutely summable
S=∑
j =−∞
∞
Γ j=Γ0+∑
j =1
∞
(Γ j+Γ j ' ) ,
where it should be noticed that Γ− j=Γ j ' . The j-th order autocovariance is
Γ j= ∑
j=−∞
∞
E (ϵt ϵt− j Z t Z ' t− j ).
The j-th sample autocovariance is given by
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Γ̂ j=
1
n ∑t= j+1
n
ϵ̂t ϵ̂t− j Z t Z ' t− j .
The HAC consistent estimate of S suggested by Newey and West (1987) is
Ŝn=Γ̂0+∑
j =1
l
ω j (Γ̂ j+Γ̂ j ' )=Γ̂0+∑
j =1
l
(1− j /bT )(Γ̂ j+Γ̂ j ' ).
with ω j=1− j /bT being the Bartlett weights, where more distant lags receive 
less weight. The Newey-West kernel corresponds to a Bartlett kernel with a 
bandwidth parameter bT=l+1. The residuals are
ϵ̂t=y t−f (x t ; β̂) ,
which are needed for estimating the covariance matrix. The somewhat circular 
implication from this is that an estimate of the parameters is needed so that the 
parameters might be calculated. How the residuals can be obtained in advance 
will be returned to later.
The kernels weight the estimated autocorrelations and the bandwidth has a role 
in determining how many autocorrelations are used in calculating the 
covariance matrix. The lag length l denotes how many lags of autocorrelations 
need to be used before the autocorrelation becomes negligible for the purpose 
of estimating the covariance matrix. The Newey-West kernel is a popular 
weighting method, though it is not the only possibility. More critical than the 
kernel choice may be the selection of the bandwidth. The chosen bandwidth 
parameter is approximately based on a guideline from Stock and Watson (2007, 
607), where a suggested way of deciding on the bandwidth parameter for the 
Newey-West kernel is 
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bT=0.75n
1
3 ,
  
rounded to the nearest integer. This guideline is in turn based on a discussion of 
optimal kernel selection by Andrews (1991). This formula is used to calculate 
the initial bandwidth parameter for the estimations in this paper, with some 
variation since the bandwidth depends on the sample size. Most of the time the 
bandwidth parameter recommended by the guideline is four, but it has been 
lowered to three since results were not very much affected either way. With the 
forecast-based estimations the bandwidth equals two. Since there is no 
definitive method of choosing the bandwidth parameter, it may be a good idea 
to try a few values to check whether results are very sensitive.
 
The construction of the estimated covariance matrix requires residuals, which 
means that they need to somehow be obtained first. For this reason the efficient 
GMM estimator may be estimated by a two-step process as described by 
Hansen (1982). First, some consistent, though inefficient, estimator (two stage 
least squares in this case) is used to compute the residuals, which are used to 
form the optimal weighting matrix. Next, the computed weighting matrix is used 
to compute the efficient GMM estimator with (43). It would also be possible to 
use an iterative method, so that the residuals from the second stage of the two-
step process are used to calculate a new weighting matrix, which is again used 
to re-estimate (43), and so forth. The second step can be iterated until the 
estimator converges. 
It should be kept in mind that any approach that uses instrument variables has 
the problem of finding good instruments. Good instruments need to be 
orthogonal to the error term and at the same time need to correlate strongly 
enough with the regressors. Instruments that do not correlate sufficiently with 
the variables that are instrumented are termed weak instruments. There has 
been some evidence (Favero and Consolo 2009)  that weak instruments could 
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be a problem in the studies that estimate policy rules as weak instruments can 
make the estimations inconsistent. In general it is also probably a good idea to 
be parsimonious when choosing instruments. Tauchen (1986) notes that 
employing very many lags of the instruments leads to a trade-off off between 
increasingly biased estimates and a decrease in variance. The general 
conclusion of Tauchen is that the increased precision from longer lags is 
outweighed by the potentially biased results. In this study, instruments are 
mostly selected by the principle that there are slightly more than what is needed 
for identification, while the chosen instruments are conventional.  
If there are more moment conditions than there are parameters to estimate so 
that L > K, the model is said to be overidentified, and then it becomes possible 
to test the overidentifying restrictions for the exogeneity of the instruments, or 
more generally the moment conditions. The J-statistic is a test statistic for the 
validity of the overidentifying restrictions. Under the null of the overidentifying 
restrictions being satisfied, the J-statistic, which includes a multiplier equivalent 
to the number of observations in (43), is asymptotically chi-square distributed 
with degrees of freedom equivalent to the number of overidentifying restrictions. 
That is, under the null hypothesis that H0 :Egt=0  
nJ (β̂)→d χL−K
2 ,
where L-K gives the degrees of freedom. If the test statistic exceeds a chi-
square critical value, or has an unexpectedly low p-value, the null is rejected. 
The rejection of the null hypothesis is an indication of some problem with the 
model. This includes the possibility that at least some of the moment conditions 
are incorrect. It is also worth noting that in small samples the J-statistic test may 
end up rejecting the null too often (Hayashi 2000).
The reliance on instrument variables and the imposition of rational expectations 
are some of the reasons to consider other methods of estimating forward-
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looking rules, such as generating forecasts, as suggested by Nikolsko-
Rzhevskyy (2008). Generating actual forecasts from the real-time data might 
have been possible, but this would also have been time-consuming and 
laborious, while requiring at least a tolerable replication of central bank 
forecasts. Since the Eurosystem and ECB staff forecasts are available those 
are used instead.
8.2 Estimated Taylor rules
To begin with, some simple contemporary Taylor rules are estimated. The 
estimations are based on (17) and (35) with results for these estimations 
reported in table 1. The rules are estimated with both OLS and GMM, in case 
the explanatory variables should happen to have an endogeneity problem. 
There is in fact some discrepancy between the estimates when the smoothing 
term is added, but this might be because of serial correlation. As can be seen 
from the table, the contemporary estimates lead to rather nonsensical results for 
the inflation coefficient, as it is always negative and rarely statistically 
significantly different from zero. While these estimates do not seem particularly 
appropriate then, it is worth mentioning that a fairly clear shift downwards in the 
estimate of the contemporary inflation coefficient is detectable when contrasting 
these results with the earlier literature. With a longer sample period of several 
decades the coefficient would most likely become positive and statistically 
significant, and possibly even strongly positive. An inflation coefficient this 
ambiguous for contemporary estimates seems to be a fairly recent 
phenomenon. One plausible explanation for this is that it is a symptom of a 
general shift in the practice of monetary policy towards a greater emphasis on 
forward-looking policy. Since these results only mirror the general conclusion of 
most other studies that it is necessary to employ forward-looking rules, these 
will be considered next.
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Table 1. Results for estimated contemporary rules for 1:1999-6:2009.
Estimation 
method
Constant  Inflation 
coefficient
 Output gap 
coefficient
Smoothing 
term
SSE Adjusted
R²
J-statistic
OLS 3.23***
(0.31)
-0.08
(0.16)
0.25***
(0.04)
- 55.89 0.54 -
OLS 4.80***
(0.95)
-0.93**
(0.40)
0.65***
(0.15)
0.92***
(0.03)
3.06 0.97 -
OLS with core 3.30***
(0.40)
-0.14
(0.21)
0.24***
(0.03)
- 55.55 0.54 -
OLS with core 6.11***
(0.96)
-1.85***
(0.52)
0.57***
(0.09)
0.92***
(0.02)
2.6 0.98 -
GMM 3.37***
(0.35)
-0.16
(0.17)
0.30***
(0.05)
- 58.05 0.52 0.19
GMM 3.93***
(0.45)
-0.43
(0.22)
0.37***
(0.06)
0.70***
(0.07)
5.99 0.95 0.95
GMM with 
core
3.50***
(0.36)
-0.29
(0.19)
0.29***
(0.04)
- 59.23 0.51 0.17
GMM with 
core
4.55***
(0.60)
-0.90**
(0.36)
0.36***
(0.06)
0.80***
(0.07)
3.53 0.97 0.34
Notes: HAC robust standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, *** denote the 
rejection of the null for a true coefficient of zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. The instruments are a constant, the second, third and fourth lag of inflation and the 
second and third lag of the output gap. SSE denotes the sum of squared errors. Regressions 
with core include an inflation measure that excludes energy and unprocessed food. The J-
statistic column reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions.
Forward-looking rules pose some difficulties. The imposition of rational 
expectations may not be an entirely ideal way to model policy (see Nikolsko-
Rzhevskyy 2008). There is no clear consensus on what the appropriate forecast 
horizon should be. Impulse response analysis suggests that monetary policy 
has its strongest effects on GDP and inflation after three to five quarters have 
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passed from an unexpected interest-rate shock (ECB 2010). On the other hand, 
the Governing Council of the ECB may not pay that much attention to future 
values of the output gap, since it is an imprecisely measured concept (Gerlach 
2007). Theoretically, the output horizon should be shorter or no longer than the 
inflation forecast horizon. The forecast horizons are chosen as nine and 12 
months for inflation and one month for the output gap, which are fairly standard 
choices. Small changes in these horizons do not really affect the results all that 
much. The equation that is estimated is based on (40). The results for forward-
looking rules are reported in table 2.
Table 2. Results for estimated forward-looking rules for 1:1999-6:2009.
Estimation 
method
Constant  Inflation 
coefficient
Output 
coefficient
Smoothing 
term
SSE Adjusted
R²
J-statistic 
GMM
[t+9, t+1]
1.86**
(1.02)
0.52
(0.48)
0.34***
(0.06)
0.86***
(0.05)
3 0.97 0.65
GMM
[t+12,t+1]
2.06***
(0.70)
0.43
(0.33)
0.36***
(0.06)
0.85***
(0.04)
2.95 0.98 0.62
GMM with 
core
[t+12,t+1]
1.50
(1.92)
0.75
(1.06)
0.32***
(0.11)
0.88***
(0.04)
2.82 0.98 0.03
Notes: HAC robust standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, *** denote the 
rejection of the null for a true coefficient of zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. The instruments are a constant, the second, third and fourth lag of inflation and the 
second and third lag of the output gap. SSE denotes the sum of squared errors. Regressions 
with core include an inflation measure that excludes energy and unprocessed food. The square 
brackets term [t+n, t+k] denotes the forecast horizon for inflation and the output gap, 
respectively. The J-statistic column reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of the validity of 
the overidentifying restrictions. 
 
Now the inflation coefficients are indeed positive, although the values are fairly 
low and not statistically significantly different from zero. In fact, they are far 
lower then what would be expected based on both theory and many earlier 
studies, as they do not even seem to fulfill the Taylor principle. This is seemingly 
true no matter what sort of forecast horizon is attempted for inflation. It is 
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possible that either the inflation shocks so far have been mostly viewed as 
temporary, or inflation expectations are so strongly anchored it is not necessary 
to take strong measures to counter price movements, or that without actual 
forecast data the coefficient is misleading, which is something that will be 
explored later on with ECB forecasts. A general conclusion of earlier studies has 
been that survey data appears to work quite well, and is something the ECB 
Governing Council pays quite a lot of attention to (Gerlach 2007). It is also 
worth mentioning a study by Gorter et al. (2008) that used mostly similar 
methods, but had access to monthly forecasts, which resulted in far larger point 
estimates. Since their data is not readily available, it is not possible to check 
whether expectations data would yield a significantly higher inflation coefficient 
when using monthly data. The forecast-based estimations that are performed 
later make do with a sparser sample. 
There is also an issue with the instruments and an important caveat that should 
be mentioned about the estimations so far. The inflation coefficient in particular 
seems to be highly sensitive to the choice of instruments. By trying different 
instruments, one thing appears fairly clear. Adding lags of the interest rate as 
instruments tends to strengthen the response to inflation, and sometimes 
makes the coefficient statistically significant. An example of this phenomenon 
can be seen in the estimated linear model found in table 4. However, the 
inflation coefficient is also highly sensitive to the exact specification of the 
instruments, in particular to how many interest rate lags are added, and 
therefore there is very little robustness to this result and the estimated 
coefficient is quite imprecise. This sensitivity means that it is difficult to conclude 
anything about the inflation coefficient except that forward-looking models tend 
to yield a positive coefficient and that instrument selection seems to matter a lot. 
The other results are not nearly as strongly affected by the choice of 
instruments, so for example the output measure remains significant in almost all 
cases. The relevance of the instruments can be tested with the R2 of the first-
stage regressions, but this test indicates that the instruments are acceptable.
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Since the inflation coefficient is imprecisely estimated, it might be worth allowing 
the coefficient to vary over time, or to allow for a nonlinear response to inflation. 
Time variation in the coefficients is beyond the scope of this thesis and should 
be more critical for longer time periods, but non-linearity is considered later on. 
The estimates from table 2 may seem unlikely and surprising, but on the other 
hand many of the more recent studies (Gerlach 2007; Aastrup and Jensen 
2010; Forte 2010) seem to have been unable to find a strong inflation response. 
Aastrup and Jensen (2010) provide a few possible explanations and argue 
particularly that both optimal discretion and commitment could manifest itself as 
a low estimate for the inflation coefficient, or that indicator variables may be a 
large component of ECB policy. Possibly these results may then reflect a central 
bank that has been quite successful in keeping inflation in check, and it is 
therefore difficult to extract a policy response from ex post data.   
Another general point of the estimations so far is the far more precisely 
estimated and statistically significant response to the output gap. This may 
imply that output measures are used for gauging future inflation pressures, or 
that the ECB places some value on output stabilization. The partial adjustment 
term that can be interpreted as inertial policy is mostly estimated in a typical 
range of 0.8-0.9 and is always strongly significant. The core measures end up 
not appearing that useful as they tend to be quite inconsistent and the J-statistic 
test also tends to reject the validity of the overidentifying restrictions for most 
models with core inflation. Only one result with core inflation is therefore 
reported in table 2, and core measures are dropped after this point because of 
these problems. Before considering the possibility of a nonlinear response to 
inflation, table 3 reports the result for adding an M3 growth variable to the 
forward-looking estimations. 
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Table 3. Forward-looking estimate with M3 growth for 1:1999-6:2009. 
Estimation 
method
Constant  Inflation 
coefficient
Output 
coefficient
M3 
growth  
Smoothing 
term
SSE Adjusted
R²
J-statistic
GMM
[t+12,t+1]
3.14***
(0.53)
0.20
(0.27)
0.45***
(0.06)
-0.21***
(0.07)
0.87***
(0.03)
2.37 0.98 0.56
Notes: HAC robust standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, *** denote the 
rejection of the null for a true coefficient of zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. The instruments are a constant, the second,third and fourth lag of inflation, the 
second, third lag and fourth lag of the output gap, and the M3 growth gap. SSE denotes the sum 
of squared errors. The square brackets term [t+n, t+k] denotes the forecast horizon for inflation 
and the output gap, respectively. The J-statistic column reports the p-value for rejecting the null 
hypothesis of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions.
The M3 growth coefficient turns out to be negative and in fact statistically 
significantly negative, which suggests that current fluctuations in money growth 
do not have an independent role in policy decisions. This finding is also not 
affected all that much by instrument selection; the coefficient remains 
consistently negative with different specifications. If money growth is important, 
it is presumably so over a long term perspective. 
 
8.3  Estimated nonlinear rules
While the estimated rules up to this point have been some of the workhorse 
models of monetary policy, there have been several proposals that involve 
nonlinear forms, since a linear response would not fully capture certain 
plausible, though speculative, aspects of policy-making. A nonlinear monetary 
policy model will therefore also be estimated as an alternative to the linear 
rules. Recently, a number of proposals for nonlinear reaction functions have 
been appearing, and the possibility of nonlinear reaction functions has gained 
more attention in the literature. The model used here has originally been 
proposed by Boinet and Martin (2008), and has been employed by at least 
Naraidoo (2010) as well. This model can, to some extent, be considered a 
generalization of the model used in a study of ECB policy by Surico (2007), 
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though that model had an additional nonlinear component resulting from a 
nonlinear Phillips curve, which is not present here. The non-linearity in this 
model arises purely from the non-quadratic preferences of the policymaker. 
While the objective function is nonstandard, it is on the other hand fairly flexible 
and allows, but does not specifically require, some additional features. The 
main additional feature is zone-like behavior, which means that the force of the 
response to deviations from targets depends on the size of the deviations. 
There can potentially be a zone around the target where the central bank is 
indifferent to minor deviations so that the the marginal loss from the deviation 
from target will be zero. Moving away from this “comfort” zone the response will 
then become increasingly forceful. The same can also be true for output. The 
model also allows for asymmetrical responses to target deviations, such as a 
stronger response to an economic downturn than an upturn. This will mean that 
the loss function has a different slope for negative and positive deviations, 
unlike in the case of a normal symmetric quadratic loss function. Zone-like 
behavior has been proposed by Orphanides and Wieland (2000), while an 
asymmetric loss function is originally a proposal by Nobay and Peel (2003).
There are a number of reasons to consider this kind of model in the case of the 
ECB. First, the model allows studying aspects of policy that otherwise would not 
be feasible with the models used so far. Second, it could be that the ECB has a 
muted response to inflation within some range near its inflation target. 
Speculatively, there could be some range around and near the official definition 
of price stability in which inflation can vary fairly freely, while it also seems quite 
realistic to expect that the response to inflation becomes more forceful when the 
deviation becomes larger. This kind of behavior could also potentially explain 
the previous ambiguities with the estimated inflation coefficient. Third, the study 
of Surico (2007) concluded that the ECB had an asymmetrical response to 
output with another kind of estimated nonlinear policy model. Fourth, it is also 
useful to look at how different models perform against each other. Finally, the 
financial crisis is a prominent example of an event where a linear response may 
not adequately capture the actual intricacies of policy (Gerlach 2010).
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Before proceeding with the estimations, the optimal rule needs to be derived. 
This will involve an optimization problem for a central bank that solves the 
problem in each period to find the target interest rate, and that exhibits non-
quadratic preferences. The framework here is more or less meant to represent 
the constrained discretion of policymakers. The period loss function will be of 
the form
L=
e−
∗
− −
∗
−1

2 
ey y 
 y
−y y 
y−1
y y
2 

2
i−i∗2 ,  (44)
 
where >0 is a coefficient that measures the central bank's aversion to  
fluctuations of the interest rate around its target rate and  is the relative weight 
on the output gap, which is denoted here by y. The parameters y, , y and  
define what form the central bank preferences take. y and  are integers that 
determine the asymmetry and zone-like properties. When y and  are greater 
than one the preferences are zone-like. The larger that   becomes, the wider 
the zone without loss becomes. When   is an odd value, there is asymmetry so 
that both the zone and the loss are asymmetric. The values of y and  
determine the sign of asymmetry and the slope of the loss function. A larger  
implies a more steeply rising loss function. When   is an odd value a positive 
value of  means that positive gaps of inflation and output are penalized more.  
The different values for these parameters lead to multiple different specifications 
of the loss function, which are elaborated on in detail in the paper of Boinet and 
Martin (2008). The usual quadratic loss function is embodied as a special case 
when y and  are equal to one and y and  approach zero. A linear 
exponential specification used by Surico (2007) is also nested as a special case 
in this loss function.   
To complete the optimization problem the economic model has to be defined. 
This will be a standard New Keynesian model that is repeated for convenience. 
Aggregate demand is again given by the forward-looking IS curve
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y t=E t y t1−i t−E t t1u t.  (45)
Aggregate supply in turn is given by the New Keynesian Phillips curve and it 
can be written as
 t=E tt1 y tet .  (46)
The assumption here is that the basic New Keynesian model is a decent 
approximate model for the euro area, though it is stylized and makes no 
allowance for backward-looking features, in particular the persistence of 
inflation. Smets and Wouters (2003) is a notable example of a study that 
analyzes these issues. The intertemporal loss function that is minimized by 
choosing the interest rate in each period is written as
Min E t[∑i=0
∞
 i L ti] ,  (47)
where L is the period loss function and  is a discount term.
 
This study departs slightly from the approach of Boinet and Martin (2008) by 
considering the interest rate decision to be based on the information from the 
current time period. As mentioned before, this is due to the data being in real-
time and constructed in such a way that it was available to the policymakers at 
the ECB before decisions for the month were typically made. This change 
should only affect the timing notation of the expectations operator and what is 
allowed into the information set. The solution itself proceeds normally as a 
discretionary optimization problem, where the central bank chooses the interest 
rate while it is constrained by the supply and demand equations. Under 
discretion the central bank cannot affect expectations directly and will choose to 
re-optimize in every period.
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The first order condition for the decision problem is 
E t f
' t1
dt1
d y t1
d y t1
d i t
E t f
' t1
d y t1
d i t
 i t−i
∗=0,  (48)
where f x t ; ,=
ex t

− x t
−1
2
 and f'(.) is the derivative of this function. 
Solving for the optimal reaction function from this condition leads to
i t=i
∗E t g  t1−
∗ t1−
∗y E t g y t1y t1 ,  (49)
where g x t ; ,=x t
−2ex t

−
1
  , =
 

 and   y=


.  
The identification of the parameters from nonlinear rules may in practice prove 
to be weak. As a solution, the rule is approximated by a second-order Taylor 
expansion when y and  tend to zero. This yields an equation that is more 
feasible to estimate and can be formulated as
i t=i
∗E t t1−
∗2 −1 1

2
 t1−
∗
y E t y t1
2 y−1 1
y
2
y t1
y .
 (50)
When this equation is written in terms of realized values it is defined as 
i t=i
∗+ωπ((πt+1−π
∗)2βπ−1(1+
απ
2
(πt+1−π
∗)βπ))
+ωy (y t+1)
2βy−1 ((1+
αy
2
)(y t+1)
βy).
 (51)
When y and    are equal to one and when y and  approach zero, this 
function reduces to a linear Taylor rule. Adding the partial adjustment equation 
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to (51) results in
i t=ρ i t−1+(1−ρ)[ω0+ωπ (πt+1−π
∗)2βπ−1(1+
απ
2
(πt+1−π
∗)βπ)]
+(1−ρ)[ωy (y t+1)
2β y−1((1+
αy
2
)(y t+1)
βy)]+ϵt ,
 (52)
The equation in (52) may be more practical to estimate as
i t=ρ i t−1+(1−ρ)[ω0+ωπ ((πt+1−π
∗)2βπ−1+
απ
2
(π t+1−π
∗)3βπ−1)]
+(1−ρ)[ωy ((y t+1)
2 βy−1+
αy
2
(y t+1)
3 βy−1)]+ϵt.
 (53)
The error term contains
t=−1− t1−
∗2−E t  t1−
∗2−1
−1−

2
 t1−
∗3−1−E t t1−
∗3−1
−y 1− y t1
2 y−1−E t yt1
2 y−1

2
 y t1
3 y−1−E t y t1
3 y−1.
 (54)
The error term is a linear combination of forecast errors and is therefore 
orthogonal to the variables in the information set at time t, which is the 
requirement for using the GMM estimation method. 
Only several cases of the multiple possible combinations from different integer 
values are considered here. Since  the inflation target of the ECB has to be 
defined for these regressions, it is treated as being equal to 2%. The first model 
is the best performing version in Boinet and Martin (2008). It has a symmetric 
response to inflation, an inflation zone and a linear response to output, so that 
y approaches zero, y=1 and =2. In the second version, =1, y=2 and  
approaches zero for a symmetric zone of output and a linear response to 
inflation. The third result is for y=2 and =2 so that both output and inflation 
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have zones without increasing loss. The fourth result is for the Taylor rule that 
results from y=1, =1 and   tending to zero. The fifth result allows for an 
asymmetric response to output, so that y=1, =1 and y ≠ 0. The sixth model 
augments the fifth with an inflation zone, which means that =2. To account for 
the lags in monetary policy, the forecast horizon is chosen as with the forward-
looking Taylor rules. The results for estimating these versions of (52) can be 
found in table 4, where the instruments are chosen to be close to those of 
Boinet and Martin (2008).
 
The results suggest that the nonlinear models do work and seem to perform 
adequately, but never really seem to be superior to the linear rule. If a lower 
standard error of regression is used as a way to rank the performance of these 
models (as in Boinet and Martin 2008), it implies that the linear Taylor rule 
outperforms the other models. While the standard error is not reported, the 
same implied ranking can  be seen from the column that reports the sum of 
squared errors since the standard error (or root mean squared error) can be 
derived from the sum of squared errors. Trying even higher values of  would 
make the model increasingly nonlinear, and judging by some trial estimations 
seems unlikely to lead to any real improvement in results, although =3 still 
works fairly well. There is no clear suggestion of anything but a symmetric 
response to inflation, though it is worth noting that the last two models in table 4 
do have an asymmetric response to output. In these cases y < 0, which implies 
a greater loss from economic downturns. This result can be contrasted with the 
results of Surico (2007) and Dolado et al. (2005), although the coefficient is not 
statistically significant in this case. The models turn out not to be that helpful in 
characterizing the inflation response, though one notable feature is that as long 
as there is a positive tightening response to inflation when =2, a large enough 
deviation from the inflation target will eventually lead to the Taylor principle 
holding in the nonlinear models. The real interest rate begins to change in those 
models when inflation is slightly over 3%, except for the first model where this 
happens only when inflation is slightly more than 3.5%. The same applies to low 
values of inflation as well in a symmetrical way (and ignoring possible concerns 
about the zero bound). Overall the evidence for  zones and asymmetry does not 
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appear to be all that strong. This conclusion appears to be quite robust to the 
choice of instruments, though the estimates do vary otherwise.
Table 4. Results from the estimated nonlinear rules 1:1999-6:2009.
Estimation 
method
   0  y      y    SSE Adjusted
R²
J-
statistic
GMM
[t+12,t+1]
y=1, =2
2.96***
(0.21)
0.45
(0.74)
0.53***
(0.12)
0.93***
(0.02)
- -0.11
(0.85)
2.95 0.98 0.21
GMM
[t+12,t+1]
y=2, =1
2.99***
(0.60)
1.46
(1.49)
0.01
(0.01)
0.97***
(0.02)
-0.14
(0.60)
- 3.3 0.97 0.39
GMM
[t+12,t+1]
y=2 , =2
2.99***
(0.42)
0.99
(1.38)
0,01*
(0.01)
0.96***
(0.02)
0.01
(0.06)
-0.24
(0.19)
3.35 0.97 0.30
GMM
[t+12,t+1]
y=1 , =1
2.79***
(0.23)
1.28*
(0.77)
0.52***
(0.11)
0.93***
(0.02)
- - 2.64 0.98 0.26
GMM
[t+12,t+1]
y=1 , =1
3.16***
(0.44)
0.91
(0.91)
0.39
(0.17)
0.95***
(0.02)
-0.27
(0.32)
- 2.86 0.98 0.24
GMM
[t+12,t+1]
y=1 , =2
3.18***
(0.40)
0.72
(1.06)
0.38**
(0.18)
0.95***
(0.03)
-0.27
(0.36)
-0.26
(0.27)
2.87 0.98 0.18
Notes: HAC robust standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, *** denote the 
rejection of the null for a true coefficient of zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. The instruments are a constant, the second,third, fourth and fifth lag of inflation, 
the second, third, fourth and fifth lag of the output gap, and the third, fourth and fifth lag of the 
interest rate. SSE denotes the sum of squared errors. The square brackets term [t+n, t+k] 
denotes the forecast horizon for inflation and the output gap, respectively. The J-statistic column 
reports the p-value for rejecting the null hypothesis of the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions  
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8.4 Forecast-based estimations
The final set of estimations includes actual forecasts as data, which could shed 
more light on the issue of the inflation response of the ECB. Forecasts also 
avoid the reliance on instruments, and could well be a more appropriate way of 
representing a central bank's response to economic information. The first set of 
estimates utilize the Eurosystem staff forecasts published biannually in ECB 
Monthly Bulletins. The second set of estimates utilize both Eurosystem and 
ECB staff forecasts; the second set of estimates will be considered separately 
after the first set. The estimations are based on those months for which the 
forecasts were available. The Eurosystem staff forecasts have been collected 
from the December and June issues of Monthly Bulletins beginning with the 
December 2000 issue and ending with the June 2010 publication. This means a 
sample of only 20 usable observations, and slightly more when the ECB staff 
forecasts are added. This could admittedly mean that the results may not be 
entirely credible, but they should still be suggestive. Projections for both the 
current year and the next year are used, though generally the projections for the 
next year seem to be more appropriate. Using estimates based solely on the 
projections for the current year lead to very unlikely results and those estimates 
are omitted from the tables. The near-term projections also clearly miss the 
rapid deterioration of the economy that happened during 2008. With the March 
forecasts it might be debatable whether the projections for the current year or 
the next year would be more appropriate.
The estimations are performed with ordinary least squares as there does not 
seem to be a reason to think of the projections as endogenous, which means 
that OLS should provide consistent estimates, though Boivin (2006) does 
discuss the possibility that staff forecasts could be correlated with the error 
term. The assumption of exogenous forecasts is maintained here, as it is also 
maintained in Boivin (2006), who notes that this should be a relatively safe 
assumption particularly when the forecasts are conditioned on no interest rate 
changes, which is seemingly the case for the forecasts used here. The 
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estimates now substitute a growth gap in place of the output gap, with 
regressions based on the formula in (42). Gorter et al. (2008) suggest that the 
ECB considers trend growth to be around 2-2.5%, and they therefore define 
trend growth as a fixed 2.25% rate. Since the constant term is not of particular 
interest here, this study lets trend growth be subsumed into the constant, which 
is one reason for the negative coefficients of the constants in table 5 and 6. This 
way it is not necessary to explicitly define potential growth. To stay consistent 
with the information from the forecasts, they are not manipulated to get either a 
constant forecast horizon or more observations by the averaging of the 
forecasts, though Orphanides and Williams (2008) do employ such an approach 
for biannual data. Something similar to their approach might be worthwhile, but 
the additional forecasts make it less necessary. It should be remarked that 
some amount of variation in forecast horizons may not change results much as 
the horizons can be strongly correlated (Boivin 2006; Berg et al. 2004), though 
this does not apply for the projections for the current year. The estimates based 
on Eurosystem staff forecasts are reported in table 5.
  
Table 5. Estimations with Eurosystem staff forecasts for 12:2000-6:2010. 
Estimation 
method
Constant  Inflation 
coefficient
Output 
growth 
coefficient
Smoothing 
term
M3 
growth 
gap
SSE Adjusted
R²
OLS
[next, current]
-5.97*
(2.86)
4.54**
(1.69)
-0.05
(0.26)
0.90***
(0.03)
- 0.44 0.98
OLS
[next, next]
-3.52**
(1.31)
2.05**
(0.73)
1.27***
(0.36)
0.89***
(0.02)
- 0.27 0.99
OLS
[next, next]
-3.06*
(1.55)
1.78*
(0.96)
1.23**
(0.30)
0.88***
(0.02)
0.05
(0.08)
0.27 0.99
Notes: HAC robust standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, *** denote the 
rejection of the null for a true coefficient of zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. SSE denotes the sum of squared errors. The terms in square brackets denote the 
forecast for inflation and output growth, respectively. The projections are for either the current 
year or for the next year.
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Results are quite striking, though the limited sample is a reason for some 
caution. Next year's GDP growth projection is required to make the output 
growth coefficient significant. The inflation coefficient is also closer to the higher 
range of values of previous estimations for the ECB, and much closer to what 
might be expected. While the standard errors are fairly wide, the point estimate 
for inflation does more convincingly than before fulfill the Taylor principle. The 
inflation coefficient is still less precisely estimated than the output coefficient, 
which is something of a recurring theme in all the estimations. The model fit 
measures also exhibit relatively good values, suggesting that the estimates 
closely track actual policy. The smoothing term is still a highly necessary 
addition. 
To achieve a slightly larger sample, the ECB staff forecasts published in March 
and September issues of the Monthly Bulletins are used as complementary 
data. These forecasts have been published since September 2004 so by adding 
them to the Eurosystem staff forecasts the total sample is 32 observations. It is 
not clear if they are also an input in policy decisions, but they should be highly 
useful as proxies. The frequency of the forecasts is therefore biannual until 
June 2004 and quarterly after that point. The results can be found in table 6.
The evidence for a strong response to inflation projections becomes even 
clearer with the additional forecasts, though the point estimate for inflation 
remains slightly noisy. In case M3 growth still might have some independent 
value in ECB policy, it is added to the estimates in tables 5 and 6, but results do 
not support any systematic role for it. Its potential usefulness as an indicator 
might of course already be reflected in the forecasts themselves.
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Table 6. Estimations with combined ECB and Eurosystem staff forecasts 
for 12:2000-6:2010. 
Estimation 
method
Constant  Inflation 
coefficient
Output 
growth 
coefficient
Smoothing 
term
M3 
growth 
gap
SSE Adjusted
R²
OLS
[next, current]
-5.41***
(1.74)
4.25***
(1.03)
-0.01
(0.16)
0.92***
(0.03)
- 0.52 0.99
OLS
[next, next]
-4.11***
(1.18)
2.52***
(0.62)
1.15***
(0.39)
0.90***
(0.02)
- 0.37 0.99
OLS
[next, next]
-3.27***
(1.09)
2.06***
(0.66)
1.03***
(0.30)
0.89***
(0.02)
0.08
(0.06)
0.37 0.99
Notes: HAC robust standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, *** denote the 
rejection of the null for a true coefficient of zero at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. SSE denotes the sum of squared errors. The terms in square brackets denote the 
forecast for inflation and output growth, respectively. The projections are for either the current 
year or for the next year.
The credibility of a sample size that is quite small could be questioned, and 
therefore some consideration should also be given to the results of Gorter et al. 
(2008). Their study used Consensus Economics forecasts with a monthly 
frequency, but with results that are not too dissimilar to these ones. Some of the 
the main differences are that the estimated inflation coefficient is generally 
higher in this study, while the estimated output coefficient is in turn slightly lower 
here. The combined results from the estimates in this study and studies like 
Gorter et al. (2008) do suggest that the explicit use of forecasts is useful and 
quite possibly preferable to the alternative of the outcome-based estimations for 
inference on ECB policy. In this way the results presented here also mirror the 
results of Orphanides and Williams (2008) for the US Fed. One way to extend 
this analysis would be to investigate whether there are major deviations in 
policy from the simple formula and the possible reasons for these deviations. 
Other possibilities include allowing for various complicating elements such as 
time variation, forecast uncertainty and perhaps non-linearity as well. These 
could be useful extensions particularly when there is slightly more data to work 
with.       
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9 Conclusion
This thesis has estimated reaction functions using both real-time data and real-
time central bank forecasts to study the recent monetary policy of the ECB and 
to see how different models perform at this task. A number of possibilities have 
been explored as the results have at times been surprising and ambivalent. 
Contemporary Taylor rules, forward-looking rules, nonlinear rules and forecast-
based measures have all been considered, but only forecast-based estimates 
seem to offer very solid conclusions. Purely contemporary rules do not seem to 
be a reasonable characterization of ECB policy. Forward-looking rules may be 
more appropriate, but on the other hand the results are quite sensitive to 
instrument selection and also ultimately ambivalent about the response to 
inflation. Nonlinear models can also be used to characterize ECB policy, but do 
not appear to have a strong advantage over a simpler linear model. A nonlinear 
response to inflation and an asymmetric response to output seem to have the 
most merit as possible departures from linearity. For the models that utilize 
rational expectations, the output gap seems the most reliably significant 
macroeconomic variable, which is a rather curious finding. The inflation 
response in the rational expectations models is quite ambiguous, either not 
seeming to fulfill the Taylor principle or possibly fulfilling it, but mostly appearing 
to be weak, not statistically significant and difficult to reliably identify. The 
uncertainty about the inflation response is only compounded by results from 
several other recent studies. 
Actual ECB forecasts give a rather different impression of policy. The forecasts 
imply that policy is to a large extent based on projections of inflation and GDP 
growth for the next year and the response to projected inflation does not 
appear weak. These projections also seem to be the most reliable and 
accurate basis for inference, even with the limited amount of observations, 
since different outcome-based estimates lead to the aforementioned 
uncertainty about the point estimate for inflation. The results also suggest that 
forecasts are a large component of ECB policy behavior and that the forecasts 
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can be potentially highly informative about policy decisions. Forecasts therefore 
seem like a promising avenue for future research, particularly when more 
forecasts become available.     
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